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Andrew C.W. Lund* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although a procedural rule, the demand requirement in derivative 
litigation is one of the most consequential doctrines in corporate law.1  Its 
touchstone, for Delaware law, is the decision in Aronson v. Lewis,2 in 
which the Supreme Court established a test for determining whether 
shareholder demand is futile and therefore unnecessary.3  This Article 
contends that the Aronson test is flawed.  Its test for demand futility, in 
certain circumstances, overly restricts board authority.  Furthermore, it 
encourages rational boards to delegate more corporate decision-making to 
management and board committees than they would otherwise.  The 
Aronson test, venerable as it is, ought to be refashioned. 
Because of the demand requirement, shareholders may not 
independently pursue legal action on behalf of a corporation and must 
instead “demand” that the corporation’s board of directors initiate 
litigation.4  The demand requirement is a natural outgrowth of the authority 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Pace School of Law.   This article reflects helpful 
comments from Barnali Choudhury, Jim Fishman, John Reed, Donald Wolfe, Jr., and the 
participants of faculty workshops at Pace Law School and the University of Akron School 
of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 386 (2002) 
(“Although the demand requirement looks like a mere procedural formality, it has evolved 
into the central substantive rule of derivative litigation.”). 
 2. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 3. At least one commentator has opined that Aronson is one of the two most influential 
Delaware corporate law cases.  See Posting of Brett McDonnell to The Conglomerate, 
Influential Corporate and Securities Law Cases, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/03/influential-cor.html#comments (last visited Mar. 
2, 2008). 
 4. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1 (“In a derivative action brought by one or more 
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated 
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may 
properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall . . . allege with particularity the efforts, if any, 
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or 
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that corporate law vests in the board to make corporate decisions, including 
litigation decisions.  Boards are then free, within the boundaries of their 
fiduciary duties, to determine whether to accept or refuse the demand.  
Demand is not required, though, if it would be futile to ask a board to 
initiate the relevant lawsuit.  This futility exception allows board authority 
to be overridden under certain circumstances in order that fiduciary duties 
remain enforceable. 
Aronson held that demand is futile when there is reasonable doubt 
that, inter alia, the underlying board decision was the product of a valid 
business judgment.5  Throughout this Article, that underlying board 
decision is referred to as the “Original Decision,” while a board’s decision 
to accept or reject the demand (assuming it is made by plaintiffs) is referred 
to as the “Demand Decision.”  Although Aronson examines the Original 
Decision, it does so not because all bad Original Decisions are necessarily 
appropriate subjects for legal action by the corporation.  Rather, Aronson 
looks to the merits of the Original Decision when there is reason to doubt 
directors’ ability to make an impartial Demand Decision if the Original 
Decision was bad, i.e., if they might face personal liability because of the 
Original Decision.6 
By asking this directorial bias question indirectly through the “valid 
business judgment” inquiry, Aronson opened a space between its principle 
(predicting demand futility by examining the likelihood of board partiality) 
and its test.  This space became more than theoretical when the Delaware 
legislature permitted corporations to adopt exculpation clauses.7  These 
clauses have been adopted by the vast majority of Delaware corporations,8 
and serve to immunize directors from personal liability for breaches of their 
duty of care.  But exculpation has no bearing on whether an Original 
Decision was the product of a “valid business judgment.”  In duty of care 
cases, then, the link between demand futility’s motivating principle and 
Aronson’s test is severed. Directors who face no personal liability will 
nevertheless be presumed incapable of judging demand fairly. 
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not 
making the effort.”). 
 5. 473 A.2d at 814. 
 6. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (explaining the court’s review process under the 
business judgment rule); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. Ch. 2003) (focusing 
on the second prong of the Aronson test). 
 7. Delaware’s exculpation statute is found at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7). 
 8. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 
32 J. CORP. L. 833, 837 (2007) (stating that while liability for bad faith decisions and loyalty 
violations cannot be waived, “personal liability for pure care violations” can be and have 
been waived by most corporations); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public 
and Private Faces of Derivative Suits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2004) (“It is very rare 
for a public company not to have taken advantage of this exculpation.”). 
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Given corporate law’s presumption of directorial authority over 
everyday corporate matters, Aronson’s demand futility test is puzzling.  It 
effectively allocates authority over corporate litigation decisions to 
shareholders despite the fact that there is no explicit reason to distrust 
directorial decision-making.  Aronson might conceivably be defended 
against this charge if either (1) its imposition upon directorial authority is 
de minimis or (2) there exist biases other than potential monetary liability 
that infect directorial decision-making.  Yet both of these defenses create as 
many issues for Delaware law as they solve. 
Moreover, Aronson is problematic for reasons other than its 
reallocation of authority within the firm.  Because Aronson logically 
requires that the basis of the derivative suit be some sort of action by the 
board,9 Delaware courts were forced to adopt a different test for fiduciary 
duty claims against directors based on their failures to act.  The Supreme 
Court did so in Rales v. Blasband which established a test for demand 
futility based explicitly on a prediction of a board’s ability to make an 
impartial Demand Decision.10  Rales’ direct approach, unlike Aronson’s, 
takes into account exculpation clauses and thereby allows less-involved 
boards to more effectively use those clauses as a shield for certain 
derivative claims at the demand stage.  That is, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has adopted a non-neutral approach as between board action and 
board delegation.  When faced with a set of decisions with a high litigation 
risk profile—especially risk involving the duty of care—rational boards 
find themselves better off, from a demand futility perspective, delegating 
the matters to board committees or employees, thereby avoiding the 
problems associated with Aronson’s failure to take exculpation clauses into 
account. 
Part II of this Article describes the demand requirement and its 
theoretical foundations.  Part III describes the different tests for demand 
futility under Aronson and Rales.  It shows how Aronson improperly 
restricts board discretion in light of ubiquitous due care exculpation.  Part 
IV observes that this aspect of Aronson, in combination with Rales, should 
lead rational boards to take a more passive role than they otherwise might 
in managing corporations under certain relatively common circumstances.  
By doing so, they would fall within the Rales line of cases and demand will 
turn solely on the probability of directors’ personal liability in a derivative 
suit.  By taking a more active managerial role, they would be vulnerable 
under Aronson even if the directors face no likelihood of personal liability. 
 9. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“[I]t should be noted that the business judgment rule 
operates only in the context of director action.  Technically speaking, it has no role where 
directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to 
act.”). 
 10. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993). 
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Part V anticipates two objections—one solely to the overdelegation 
argument and the other to both the overdelegation and board authority 
arguments.  First, it may be that recent Delaware case law regarding 
directors’ duty of good faith makes board inaction less likely to be 
exculpable under a 102(b)(7) charter provision.  If so, boards would have 
little incentive to overdelegate because the Rales test turns out poorly for 
them if they face a substantial likelihood of personal liability for breach of 
good faith.  But this argument places far too much weight on the doctrine 
of good faith and should give rational boards little reason to discount the 
litigation-related advantages of delegation.  Second, it may be that 
whatever odd implications are created by Aronson at the demand stage, 
they are of no real import because exculpation clauses can be enforced 
through a contemporaneous motion to dismiss.  This objection, however, 
fails to take into account (1) the different evidentiary standards applicable 
to motions to dismiss for failure to make demand and 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss based on an exculpatory clause and (2) the characterization of an 
exculpatory clause as an affirmative defense.  Part VI observes that the 
Aronson and Rales tests need to be harmonized and concludes that, despite 
Rales’s potential for underestimating directors’ biases, the Aronson test 
should be revised to reflect Rales’s more direct approach. 
II. THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT AND DEMAND FUTILITY 
A. Boards, Shareholders and Derivative Suits 
1. Board Authority 
The Delaware General Corporate Law allocates authority over a 
corporation’s everyday decision-making to the board of directors except as 
otherwise provided by law or charter provisions.11  The Aronson court 
observed that Section 141(a) establishes “[a] cardinal precept of the [law] . 
. . is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation.”12  As a descriptive matter, it is certainly the case 
that corporate law places control of the day-to-day operations of a 
corporation in the hands of a board as opposed to the hands of 
shareholders.13 
 11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a). 
 12. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811. 
 13. Lynn Stout has noted that, in fact, a surprisingly small number of Delaware firms 
opt out of director control as allowed by the last clause of § 141(a).  See Lynn A. Stout, The 
Shareholder as Ulysses:  Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public 
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003). 
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The normative basis for directors’ authority is the matter of some 
debate,14 as are the circumstances in which that authority ought to be 
transferred to or shared with other constituencies, particularly 
shareholders.15  There is consensus, however, that corporations realize 
significant gains through the allocation of everyday decision-making 
authority to a small group of actors.  If authority were spread over a wide 
group (say, public shareholders), significant collective action problems 
would arise.  Diffuse decision-makers are likely to be rationally apathetic 
towards the decision-making process as they recognize that they have little 
ability to affect the outcome and will only realize a fraction of the 
consequences of any particular decision.16  To the extent they do 
participate, they would likely be poorly informed relative to insiders.17  
Moreover, the diffuse decision-makers might have significantly different 
interests, some of which may conflict.18  And, of course, corporate 
decision-making by thousands of participants would be incredibly 
unwieldy and slow.19  On the other hand, if authority is vested in a small 
body that is perceived as relatively neutral and consistent, it may encourage 
other constituencies to make otherwise risky firm-specific investments.20  
All of this counsels for vesting day-to-day operating authority in a small, 
 14. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (arguing against Lucian Bebchuk’s 
proposal for shareholder empowerment and for the preservation of the current regime of 
limited shareholder voting rights); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (opposing the dominant principal-
agent model of the public corporation driven by the goal of shareholder wealth 
maximization). 
 15. Suffice it to say that the appropriate outer bounds of board authority vis-a-vis 
shareholder authority are a topic about which a significant amount of academic and judicial 
ink has been spilled.  For a taste of the debate in regard to shareholder voting, see Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) (hereinafter 
Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise); Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of 
Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733 (2007); Jonathan R. Macey, Too Many Notes and Not 
Enough Votes:  Lucian Bebchuk and Emperor Joseph II Kvetch About Contested Director 
Elections and Mozart's Seraglio, 93 VA. L. REV. 759 (2007); John F. Olson, Professor 
Bebchuk's Brave New World:  A Reply to "The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise", 93 VA. 
L. REV. 773 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefit of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 789 (2007); E. Norman Veasey, The Shareholder Franchise is Not a Myth: A 
Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811 (2007). 
 16. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 15, at 792. 
 17. See, e.g., id. 
 18. See, e.g., id., at 794-95.  For more information, see Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate 
Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (N.Y.U., 
Stern Sch. of Bus., 2008), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~aagrawa1/ 
AGRAWAL_paper.pdf (demonstrating that union shareholders are less likely to support 
director nominees at corporations at which the union’s members are employed). 
 19. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 15, at 792. 
 20. Id. at 795-97. 
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relatively well-informed and presumptively neutral group.21 
Corporate litigation decisions are subsumed within this day-to-day 
operating authority.22  As an example, assume that a counterparty to a 
contract with Corporation X fails to provide services or deliver goods as 
promised.  Corporation X has the ability to go to court and enforce the 
contract.  Whether Corporation X will litigate, however, is up to the board 
(or its delegate).  After all, not all potential actions that a corporation may 
institute are necessarily worth pursuing.  The board may choose not to file 
a suit because, for instance, the litigation costs are too high relative to the 
amount in question or the litigation would threaten to distract management 
from running the corporation. 
2. Derivative Suits 
What can shareholders do if they believe the board’s litigation 
decision reduces firm value—say by failing to pursue a valuable claim 
against the counterparty?  The classic response is that shareholders can vote 
(for new directors), sell (their stock to other investors) or sue (directors for 
breach of fiduciary duty).23  Continuing the above example, the third option 
is accomplished through a derivative suit whereby the shareholder sues on 
behalf of the corporation contending (1) that the corporation ought to have 
sued the director for a breach of fiduciary duty in making a bad decision, 
and (2) because it failed to do so, the shareholder would like to step into the 
corporation’s shoes and proceed with the litigation on the corporation’s 
behalf.24 
 21. Theoretically, this smaller group could be a unitary executive rather than a board.  
But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?  Group Decision-making in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (noting the decision-making improvements gained 
by having a small group of decision-makers).  Note that this justification for board authority 
explicitly avoids application to authority outside the scope of day-to-day operating 
authority.  Some commentators have argued that board authority is problematic in respect of 
a certain class of “rules-of-the-game decisions.”  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting 
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case 
for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).  Others have argued that 
even in those cases, the advantages of board authority may outweigh any disadvantages.  
See Bainbridge, supra note 14; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic:  A 
Traditionalist’s Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 772-73 (Del. 1990); Bradley T. 
Ferrell, A Hybrid Approach:  Integrating the Delaware and the ALI Approaches to 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 248 (1999). 
 23. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 483 (1995); 
Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling and Limits on the 
Board’s Power to “Just Say No,” 67 U. CIN. L. REV 999, 1000-01 (1999) (introducing 
shareholder power to respond to actions of directors). 
 24. See David A. Skeel, The Accidental Elegance of Aronson v. Lewis 3 (U of Penn, 
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Derivative suits thus represent an important avenue by which 
shareholders can minimize agency costs that arise in widely-held 
corporations.  In the earlier hypothetical, directors may obtain benefits by 
not suing the counterparty, such as avoiding the hassle of being deposed, 
avoiding a reputation as a litigious person, or even receiving a bribe.  
Moreover, they may undervalue the recovery to be obtained by the 
corporation because they are unlikely to receive much, if any, of the benefit 
from the judgment.25 
Leaving the contract hypothetical aside, take perhaps the most obvious 
example of the diverging interests of shareholders and managers—theft of 
corporate property or cash by the managers.  Shareholders cannot sue the 
thief directors directly because the harm was incurred by the corporation 
and not directly by the shareholders.  Because the claim belongs to the 
corporation, it must initiate the litigation.  However, in this case, the 
thieves have the authority to decide whether or not the company should 
sue.26  Because they will, at the very least, be forced to reimburse the 
corporation, the directors cannot be expected to direct the corporation to 
bring a lawsuit.  Shareholders who want the corporation to pursue litigation 
against the directors can attempt to force the corporation to do so through a 
derivative suit. 
Derivative suits, however, pose a problem for the initial allocation of 
authority within the corporation.  It is easy to see that the power to sue 
derivatively could very well swallow up the litigation-related authority that 
boards are granted under Section 141(a).27  What if it is not certain either 
that the theft occurred or that, assuming something improper did happen, a 
lawsuit to recover the stolen money is in the firm’s best interests?  For 
Section 141(a) to be effective, then, boards need to be protected to a certain 
degree from derivative suits.28 
Inst for Law & Econ, Research Paper No. 07-28, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027010 (detailing the history of the derivative suit). 
 25. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices: The New 
Corporate Governance Paradigm 23 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 301, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928100 (discussing potential incentives for 
outside directors to engage in good performance). 
 26. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra note 15, at 679-82 (discussing 
role of shareholders). 
 27. See Aronson, 473 A. 2d at 811 (“By its very nature the derivative action impinges 
on the managerial freedom of directors.”). 
 28. But see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative 
Suit:  An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 262 
(1981) (explaining how courts have upheld directors’ ability to avoid derivative suits). 
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B. The Demand Requirement 
This protection is given effect, to a large extent, by the substantive 
rules of fiduciary obligations.  The business judgment rule29 limits the 
number of triable fiduciary claims.30  In the breach-of-contract example, 
the board chose not to sue the counterparty.  The failure to sue will mean 
that the corporation will not realize any damages or settlement from the 
counterparty.  If shareholders sue derivatively, the business judgment rule, 
assuming it has not been rebutted, acts to protect the board even if a judge 
or jury might ultimately agree with the shareholders as to the merits of the 
decision not to litigate. 
The business judgment rule might prevent many incursions by 
shareholders into board decision-making via the derivative suit. However, 
the business judgment rule functions as a device within litigation.  
Necessarily, a board (and therefore a corporation) will incur costs to 
convince a court that the business judgment rule ought to protect the 
board’s Original Decision.  Those costs were imposed because a single 
shareholder decided to file a derivative suit.  Put another way, from the 
time at which the shareholder sues derivatively until the time at which the 
suit is dismissed, Section 141(a)’s allocation of authority has been turned 
on its head.  The derivative suit, even if ultimately unsuccessful, is at least 
for a fleeting (or not-so-fleeting) moment a threat to the board’s authority 
over the litigation decision itself. 
Moreover, to the extent that application of the business judgment rule 
is uncertain, there are significant incentives for the board to settle all 
litigation.31  The vast majority of companies purchase policies insuring 
both directors against liability risk and the companies themselves for 
reimbursements paid to directors under indemnification agreements.32  
Given the limitations placed on director indemnification in adjudicated 
suits,33 directors face a small but existent probability of a large loss.  For 
 29. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (establishing presumption that “in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”) 
 30. Id. (“The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial 
prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a).”). 
 31. See DOOLEY, supra note 23, at 304-05. 
 32. See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper:  Why the SEC Should Mandate 
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1168 (2006) (citations omitted) (noting a survey indicating that 99% of 
U.S. company respondents had purchased D&O policies in 2004). 
 33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145(b) (2006) (requiring certification that the director 
“acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed 
to the best interests of the corporation” as well as an additional judicial determination, in the 
event of liability, that the director “is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity” for 
“proper” expenses). 
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directors, then, the decision to settle even meritless suits is almost costless, 
save for potentially increased insurance premia which will, in any event, be 
passed on to the corporation. 
The demand requirement is corporate law’s answer to these problems.  
Under the Delaware Chancery Court rules, a shareholder must make a 
demand on the board requesting that it cause the corporation to sue 
whomever it is that the shareholder believes ought to be sued.34  The 
demand requirement, insofar as it gives the board the power to say “no” to 
a derivative suit, preserves the original allocation of authority to the 
board.35 
The demand requirement serves other salutary purposes as well.  First, 
the demand requirement promotes judicial efficiency by keeping fights 
inside boardrooms and outside of courtrooms.36  Alternative dispute 
resolution has become extremely popular as a way to take some of the 
pressure off of overburdened courts.37  Delaware’s demand requirement 
establishes a system of extrajudicial dispute resolution that may allow the 
Chancery Court to devote more time to matters not otherwise susceptible to 
alternative resolution.38 
Similar but distinct from its effect on the allocation of authority within 
a firm, the demand requirement serves as a filter for frivolous suits.39  As 
noted above, there are significant incentives for directors to settle even 
non-meritorious derivative suits.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys are aware of these 
incentives and are likely to file even non-meritorious suits.40  The demand 
requirement, to the extent it provides boards with an early crack at 
dismissing the action or handing it over to the board, removes some of the 
incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring frivolous cases. 
The demand requirement serves its function well for as long as the 
interests of the board in regard to the Demand Decision do not diverge 
 34. Subject to claims of demand futility or wrongful refusal discussed infra Part III.  
See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. (specifying the statutory demand requirement). 
 35. See, e.g., Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500. 
 36. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000) (explaining how the demand 
requirement can be used to avoid litigation). 
 37. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 983 
(2005) (defining alternative dispute resolution as a source of private due process); Charles 
Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2104-05 (2002) 
(explaining how alternative dispute resolution saves money). 
 38. See, e.g., Ferrell, supra note 22, at 248 and n. 26 (explaining the potential for intra-
corporate resolution as a rationale for the demand requirement). 
 39. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12. 
 40. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate 
Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25-26 (1999) (showing how settlement incentives may 
be exacerbated by the rules surrounding plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in derivative litigation); 
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON & 
ORG. 55, 65 (1991) (same). 
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from those of shareholders.  Imagine that the “demanded” litigation has, as 
a named defendant, a board member.  In fact, most derivative suits are 
attempts to force the corporation to sue an insider, not a counterparty to a 
contract or a third party tortfeasor.41  Can we trust directors to sue 
themselves or other directors when appropriate?  If we cannot, the demand 
requirement may allocate too much authority to the board at the expense of 
the enforcement of directors’ fiduciary duties.  There can be such a thing as 
too much protection of directorial prerogative—after all, even the business 
judgment rule can be rebutted.  Without a way around the demand 
requirement in cases where directors are disabled from independently 
making a Demand Decision, directors’ fiduciary duties would be rendered 
unenforceable and directors may systematically engage in value-destroying 
activity. 
III. THE DEMAND FUTILITY TESTS:  ARONSON AND RALES 
Shareholders do have ways to get around the demand requirement.  
First, they can proceed with a derivative suit without making a demand on 
the board if demand would have otherwise been futile.42  Second, if they 
make demand and the board “wrongfully” refuses the demand, 
shareholders can proceed with the lawsuit.43  Demand futility, however, is 
by far the most popular of these two routes for shareholder-plaintiffs.44  
Indeed, demand futility has been called “the critical issue in derivative 
litigation.”45 
 41. See Skeel, supra note 24, at 3. 
 42. There is some dispute as to whether a futility exception ought to exist or whether 
issues of futility would be better off being raised in a wrongful refusal action.  See Kamen v. 
Kemper Finan. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1344 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d 500 U.S. 90 (1991) 
(adopting a universal demand requirement); Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate 
Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 502-03 (1992) (criticizing universal demand); Jeffrey S. 
Facter, Fashioning a Coherent Demand Rule for Derivative Litigation in California, 40 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379, 379 (2000) (proposing that California adopt a universal demand 
rule). 
 43. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217-19 (Del. 1996), overruled on 
other grounds; Brehm, 746 A.2d 244. 
 44. The general consensus is that it is almost impossible for shareholder plaintiffs to 
prevail in a “wrongful refusal” action.  See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, 
Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay:  An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH U. L. Q. 569, 
576-77 (2001); Thompson &  Thomas, supra note 8, at 1782 (examining data showing that 
in most cases demand is not made on the board of directors). 
 45. Stephen Bainbridge, The Demand Requirement in Derivative Litigation: Part II, 
http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/the_demand_requirem
ent_in_derivative_litigation_part_ii/ (emphasis added). 
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A. Aronson 
Perhaps surprisingly, the general test for demand futility in Delaware 
has remained constant for over 20 years.46  In Aronson, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that demand is futile when “under the particularized 
facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that:  (1) the directors are 
disinterested and independent, and (2) the challenged transaction was 
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”47  The two 
prongs are intended to track the business judgment rule; in fact, the second 
prong consists solely of a reference to the rule.48  The Aronson court drove 
the point home, noting that demand futility “is inextricably bound to issues 
of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine’s applicability.”49 
Why should demand futility be inextricably bound with the business 
judgment rule?  The business judgment rule might be a logical jumping-off 
point for evaluating a Demand Decision, just as it is the standard for 
evaluating most board decisions.  But the Aronson test—especially its 
second prong—does not directly apply the business judgment rule (even 
prospectively) to the Demand Decision.  Instead, it focuses its analysis on 
the Original Decision, the “challenged transaction.” 
It is not clear why demand futility should have anything to do with the 
Original Decision.  Demand futility is necessarily a predictive statement 
about the Demand Decision.  Shareholder plaintiffs have to argue that it 
would make no difference—it would be futile—to ask the board to make 
the Demand Decision.  It would make no difference because it is obvious, 
for some reason or another, that the board will reject demand.  Absent some 
link between (1) the nature of the Original Decision and (2) our expectation 
of how the board will make a Demand Decision, the Original Decision is 
more or less beside the point for demand futility purposes. 
The lack of a necessary nexus between the quality of the Original 
Decision and the futility of demand assumes that the primary reason to 
require demand is to protect board authority.  As discussed above, the 
 46. See Joshua L. Vineyard, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same?  
Twenty Years of Corporate Board Domination and the Aronson v. Lewis Standard, 72 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2004) (demonstrating the pervasive use of the Aronson standard). 
 47. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.  For some period following the court’s decision in 
Aronson there was doubt as to whether the two prongs of the Aronson test were to be 
viewed in the conjunctive or the disjunctive.  The debate was ended in favor of the latter. 
See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 206 (Del. 1991). 
 48. It is often noted that the second prong imports the business judgment rule into the 
demand futility decision.  But the questions of disinterestedness are themselves foundational 
questions in any business judgment analysis. See, e.g., DOOLEY, supra note 42, at 471-77.  
To the extent a director is interested in a challenged transaction, he or she will not receive 
protection of the business judgment rule.  Id. 
 49. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (emphasis added). 
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argument for board authority over litigation decisions begins with the 
observation that whether a lawsuit is in the corporation’s best interests 
turns on a number of factors in addition to the merits of the claim, such as 
litigation costs (if the case is a close call requiring substantial litigation), 
reputational harm, and the potential for management distraction.  These are 
extra-legal issues about which the courts may have little institutional 
competence.50   The business judgment rule is justified in large part by the 
view that boards are better than courts at making business decisions like 
these.  Absent other considerations, boards should decide such matters and 
shareholders are generally better off if particular shareholders cannot 
initiate litigation without the board’s approval. 
However, in addition to protecting board authority, the demand 
requirement also serves to filter out strike suits.51  That function necessarily 
involves review of the Original Decision because the quality of the Original 
Decision is crucial to determining whether or not the derivative suit is a 
“strike” suit or a legitimate one.  Thus, even if there were no reason to 
believe that boards ought to have any authority to decide when derivative 
suits ought to proceed, the potential for frivolous derivative suits poses a 
problem for firm value.52   Quite apart from any concerns about the 
advantages of board authority, a prophylactic device might be needed to 
separate the good derivative suits from the bad ones. 
Considering the centrality of board authority to corporate governance 
generally, how important of an argument for requiring demand is “demand 
as strike suit filter”?  One gets something of an answer by reading Vice 
Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Guttman v. Huang: 
If the legal rule was that demand was excused whenever, by mere 
notice pleading, the plaintiffs could state a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim against a majority of the board, the demand 
requirement of the law would be weakened and the settlement 
value of so-called “strike suits” would greatly increase, to the 
perceived detriment of the best interests of stockholders as 
investors.  But, if the demand excusal test is too stringent, then 
stockholders may suffer as a class because the deterrence effects 
of meritorious derivative suits on faithless conduct may be too 
weak. The second prong of Aronson therefore balances the 
conflicting policy interests at stake by articulating a safety valve 
that releases a suit for prosecution when the complaint meets a 
heightened pleading standard of particularity, because in these 
 50. See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (“[W]e recognize that 
(t)he final substantive judgment whether a particular lawsuit should be maintained requires a 
balance of many factors ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee 
relations, fiscal as well as legal.”) (quotations omitted). 
 51. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 352 (Del. Ch. 2007) ; Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255. 
 52. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances the threat of liability to the directors required to 
act on the demand is sufficiently substantial to cast a reasonable 
doubt over their impartiality.53 
On the one hand, the demand requirement serves the distinct function 
of strike suit filter.  On the other hand, demand futility is about board 
authority and the need to depart therefrom only when its benefits are 
outweighed by a systematic inability to hold fiduciaries responsible for 
breaches of their duties.  Filtering for strike suits is one benefit of granting 
a board significant discretion, but it is not the only one.  For example, even 
if a claim is meritorious, there may be other reasons to not pursue litigation. 
Why do courts talk so much about strike suits?  Because limiting them is 
the largest, but not sole, benefit provided by the demand requirement’s 
return of authority to the board. 
The second prong’s implicit adoption of “demand as strike suit filter” 
allows courts to avoid thorny problems raised by board authority over 
derivative litigation.  In this regard, there is a fairly uncontroversial starting 
point:  directors with financial interests in the outcome of Demand 
Decisions (or who are beholden to people with such interests) should not be 
trusted to make them in the best interests of the corporation.  But what if 
boards’ Demand Decisions are consistently problematic outside of this 
admittedly limited set of cases?  For instance, directors may simply be 
embarrassed by their past conduct (or past omissions) and may seek to 
quash a derivative suit to avoid the reputational harm a lawsuit might 
cause.54  Alternatively, bounded rationality and/or structural biases may 
prevent even the least interested or embarrassed directors from judging 
demand fairly by making it difficult if not impossible for directors to either 
come to grips with the harm they have caused the corporation or take action 
to rectify the situation.55 
If true—and it has at least some anecdotal support considering the 
paucity of demand acceptances—this view would lead to the conclusion 
that demand is, in fact, almost always futile.  Adopting such a position—
call it something like the “strong bias” view—should probably lead to the 
rechristening of whatever test is adopted.  The operative question would 
not be whether demand is futile because it would always be futile.  Rather, 
any preliminary test would simply enable a court to weed out frivolous 
suits. 
The problems created by taking this position are thorny because there 
are, of course, costs in asking only whether a complaint satisfies some 
 53. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. Ch. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 54. It is not clear what marginal reputational harm is caused by allowing a suit to 
proceed once a complaint (no matter how “blocked” it may ultimately be by the demand 
requirement or an exculpation clause) is filed and presumably made public. 
 55. See e.g., Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500. 
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minimum threshold of viability.  Cutting boards out of the action means 
that they can no longer evaluate the extra-legal considerations concerning a 
derivative suit’s value to a corporation.  A test that assumes all demand is 
futile and serves solely as a filter for strike-suits would then likely fail to 
stop suits that—while potentially meritorious—are not in the shareholders’ 
best interests, all things considered.  Courts could be required to take the 
extra-legal considerations into account—think of a Zapata-style analysis 
for all derivative suits—but we cannot be sure that courts will do a great 
job of evaluating such considerations.56 
Moreover, the strong bias view is a fairly blunt instrument.  The 
problem with embarrassment or bounded rationality or structural bias, 
unlike financial interest, is that it is hard to prove.  To create a workable 
framework, corporate law will likely have to assume either (1) these states 
of mind always exist for all boards or (2) never exist for any board.  While 
admittedly a not-uncontroversial description of the way boards actually 
operate, the latter assumption seems at least to comport with Delaware 
jurisprudence’s most basic foundation.57 
Unless one adopts the strong bias view, the demand requirement must 
be premised primarily on the need to protect board authority.  The Aronson 
opinion itself supports this approach.  For instance the Supreme Court 
stated that demand futility is intended to capture the instances in which a 
board “is under an influence which sterilizes [its] discretion [as to whether 
to proceed with the suit in question].”58  If that is to be the question, any 
test for demand futility needs to focus primarily on the putative Demand 
Decision, not the Original Decision. 
But then why do Aronson’s prongs turn on the quality of the Original 
Decision?  The Original Decision may be important in balancing board 
authority with enforcement of fiduciary duties.59  Directors who were 
financially interested in the Original Decision will likely be financially 
interested in the Demand Decision.  Those dominated by parties who were 
interested in the Original Decision are likely to be similarly dominated by 
those who are interested in the Demand Decision.  Thus, the first Aronson 
prong, which can look backwards to the Original Decision, serves as a 
sensible proxy for determining whether the board is capable of being 
disinterested and independent in making a Demand Decision. 
 56. But see Hill & McDonnell supra note 8, at 855 (suggesting that courts evaluate the 
level of structural bias present in board decision-making).  For criticism of Zapata on this 
point, see e.g., Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 
WASH. U. L. Q. 821, 850 (2004) and accompanying footnotes. 
 57. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (describing post-Rales cases establishing 
that an exculpation clause removes any concern as to a director’s ability to make an 
independent demand decision). 
 58. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 59. See Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 230 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
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Likewise, the second Aronson prong, which looks strictly backwards 
to the Original Decision, serves as a proxy of sorts.  As mentioned earlier, 
to the extent that the Original Decision was not the subject of a valid 
business judgment, the business judgment rule would not apply in a 
derivative suit and directors could potentially be personally liable for 
damages.  In such cases we ought to be skeptical of directors’ ability to rise 
above their financial interest in not being sued.60  The second Aronson 
prong thus stands in as a substitute for a certain kind of director interest at 
the demand stage.61 
The following illustrates the ways in which the Original Decision and 
the Demand Decision are distinct bases for judging demand futility.  The 
first Aronson prong involves questions of director disinterest and 
independence.  Take the following example:  Company X has a seven-
member board of directors.  Company Y serves as a supplier for Company 
X.  Six months earlier, Company X’s board met to discuss a new agreement 
with Company Y.  Company X’s directors voted to enter into an agreement 
with Company Y under which Company Y would deliver supplies to 
Company X at a price significantly higher than the market rate for such 
supplies.  Now imagine that shareholders discover that the seven Company 
X directors were the sole shareholders of Company Y.  If Company X 
shareholders demand that Company X sue the directors for breaching their 
duty of loyalty, demand will be excused under the first Aronson prong.62  
Note that the analysis is focused on the Original Decision rather than the 
Demand Decision. 
What if only three of Company X’s directors had been the sole 
shareholders of Company Y, but one of those three was the CEO of 
Company X.  Assume further that two of the other four directors of 
Company X were employees of Company X subject to being fired by the 
CEO/director.  In that case there may be a reasonable doubt that, with 
respect to the decision to award Company Y the contract, the three 
directors were disinterested and the other two were independent.63  
 60. One might sensibly ask whether there is even a cognizable interest in that case, 
given directors’ insurance. 
 61. It is perhaps worth also noting that the second prong may be superfluous.  If the 
first Aronson prong (disinterestedness and independence) was read broadly to look both 
back to the Original Decision as well as prospectively to the Demand Decision, it could 
easily capture this fear-of-liability point. 
 62. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (“Certainly, if this is an ‘interested’ director 
transaction, such that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to the board majority 
approving the transaction, then the inquiry ceases.”); see also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 
619, 624 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds; Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
2000). 
 63. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (“Independence means that a director’s decision is 
based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous 
considerations or influences. . . . [However, W]e conclude that in the demand-futile context 
  
718 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
al Decision. 
 
 
Demand would be excused.  Again, disinterest and independence are 
measured by reference to the Origin
This need not be the case, however.  Taking the hypothetical further, 
what if the three Company X directors were interested in the contract at the 
time of the Original Decision but none of the other four directors were 
employees of Company X?64  Absent any other facts, a majority of the 
board was disinterested and independent in regard to the Original Decision. 
Assume that, sometime after the Original Decision, one or more of the non-
interested, independent directors became employees of Company X, 
subject to control by the interested CEO/director.  Now, such an 
employee/director would likely not be independent with respect to the 
Demand Decision.  In such cases, demand would surely be futile under the 
first prong of Aronson, notwithstanding the fact that there was no 
reasonable doubt that the majority of directors, when making the Original 
Decision, was disinterested or independent.65  Thus, the first Aronson 
prong seems to be applicable to either the Original Decision or the Demand 
Decision. 
The second Aronson prong, on the other hand, is very clearly limited 
to review of the Original Decision.66  Continuing the hypothetical from 
above, assume three interested Company X directors and four disinterested 
and independent directors both at the time of the Original Decision and at 
the time of the Demand Decision.  Assume further, however, that either (a) 
a plaintiff charging domination and control of one or more directors must allege 
particularized facts manifesting ‘a direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to 
comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons) doing the controlling.’”) 
 64. Assume that the approval of the contract with Company Y was not approved by 
disinterested directors pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §141(a)(1) because, for instance, 
three of the four disinterested directors rejected the deal. 
 65. See, e.g., Rales, 634 A.2d at 936 (“To establish lack of independence, [plaintiff] 
must show that the directors are ‘beholden’ to the [interested defendants] or so under their 
influence that their discretion would be sterilized.”). 
 66. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (“Hence, the Court of Chancery must [inquire] . . . 
into the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board’s approval thereof.”) 
(emphasis added).  Conceptually, one could imagine that the second Aronson prong applied 
to the Demand Decision is roughly the wrongful refusal analysis.  The “wrongfulness” of 
the refusal is determined via application of the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Grimes v. 
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218-19 (Del. 1996).  Accordingly, the shareholder claiming 
wrongful refusal must “allege facts with particularity creating a reasonable doubt that the 
board. . . acted independently or with due care in responding to the demand.”  Id. at 1219.  
Other iterations of the wrongful refusal standard require allegations that “directors [did not 
act] in an informed manner [or] with due care [or] in a good faith belief that their action was 
in the best interest of the corporation.”  Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 198 (Del. 1991).  
Any potential conflict between the two standards was apparently resolved in Scattered Corp. 
v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., 701 A.2d 70 (Del. 1997).  There, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that “[f]ailure of an otherwise independent-appearing board or committee to act 
independently is a failure to carry out its fiduciary duties in good faith or to conduct a 
reasonable investigation.”  701 A.2d at 75. 
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the disinterested directors who voted in favor of the deal with Company Y 
failed to consider all reasonably available material information,67 or (b) the 
transaction with Company Y was so egregiously one-sided as to be 
irrational or waste.68  Aronson’s second prong is satisfied by looking at the 
procedural and perhaps substantive quality of the Original Decision.69  In 
this case, demand would be futile because the Original Decision would not 
be entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule.  Expectations 
about the procedure and/or substance of the board’s putative Demand 
Decision are excluded. 
Aronson’s second prong makes sense as a proxy for a certain kind of 
director interest—fear of personal liability.  And a helpful proxy it is, as 
long as directors are potentially liable for Original Decisions that were not 
the subject of a valid business judgment.  That was true at the time Aronson 
was decided but is not necessarily so since the Delaware legislature 
permitted companies to include exculpation provisions in their certificates 
of incorporation.70  Section 102(b)(7) permits companies to exculpate 
directors from derivative suit liability, at least to the extent they do not 
violate their duty of loyalty or fail to act in good faith.71  Accordingly, the 
statute is generally interpreted as providing protection to directors for 
breaches of their duty of care.72 
If directors are protected from liability for breaches of the duty of 
care, it will be difficult to prove that their discretion would be “sterilized” 
when making a Demand Decision.73  Without the specter of personal 
 67. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the 
determination of whether business judgment of board of directors is informed  turns on 
whether directors have informed themselves, prior to making business decision, of all 
material information reasonably available to them). 
 68. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 266 (stating that alleging waste requires pleading 
“particular facts tending to show that no reasonable business person would have made the 
[same] decision . . . under these circumstances”). 
 69. Delaware courts have expressly rejected “substantive due care.”  See, e.g., Brehm, 
746 A.2d at 264.  However, there is arguably a practical outer boundary, the crossing of 
which resembles something akin to breaching substantive due care.  See David Rosenberg, 
Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 321-22 (2007). 
 70. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7). 
 71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8  § 102(b)(7)(i) and (ii).  Exculpation is also not available 
for intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 174 
violations (unlawful dividend payments, stock purchases or redemptions), or transactions 
through which directors receive improper personal benefits.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 
102(b)(7)(ii)-(iv). 
 72. See, e.g., John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of 
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to 
Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 114 (2004) (citing treatises to that effect). 
 73. As discussed earlier, potential personal liability may not be the only basis on which 
directors might systematically make poor Demand Decisions.  See supra notes 54 and 
accompanying text.  See also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. 2003). 
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liability hanging over their head, what else could a shareholder likely prove 
that would lead a court to believe that the directors could not make an 
independent Demand Decision?  Yet Aronson’s second prong offers 
plaintiffs a non-rebuttable presumption that demand is futile anyway.74 
The existence of exculpation clauses, then, may cause the second 
prong to be a less-than-perfect proxy for director interest in the Demand 
Decision.  There are a set of cases namely duty of care cases—where the 
connection between (1) the lack of a valid business judgment regarding the 
Original Decision and (2) directors’ inability to judge a demand fairly may 
simply not exist.  As a consequence, boards are prevented from 
determining, for instance, that prudential considerations may counsel in 
favor of rejecting demand.75  In those cases, Aronson fails to properly 
balance board authority against enforcement of fiduciary duties. 
B. Rales 
Non-action may provide the basis for personal liability if a director’s 
failure to act violates his or her duty of oversight.76  Non-action, in this 
sense, does not include the case in which a board considers taking a 
particular action and decides that continuing with the status quo is the best 
course of action.  The decision to not act is itself considered a board 
action.77  Rather, board non-action covers instances in which decisions are 
never the subject of deliberations by a majority of the board and are 
therefore not acted upon by that majority. 
Historically, the duty of oversight was subsumed within the duty of 
 74. See Donald J. Wolfe & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial Practice 
in the Delaware Court of Chancery § 9.02 (b)(3)(iii) n. 310-312 (“Aronson’s second prong 
does not focus exclusively on the potential risk of liability of defendants arising from the 
underlying transaction [sic] but upon whether that transaction is one that would be entitled 
to the presumptions of valid business judgment.  Whether the directors would or would not 
be exculpated from personal liability by such a charter provision would seem to have 
nothing to do with whether the decision itself was reached honestly and in good faith and 
the existence of such a provision therefore is likely to be viewed as irrelevant to Aronson’s 
second prong.”) (internal citations omitted).  Recently, the opinion in In re Lear Corp. 
S’holders Litig., 2008 WL 4053221, *6-7 (Del. Ch. 2008) seems to have analyzed 
Aronson’s second prong by including considerations of the applicability of an exculpation 
clause.  Vice Chancellor Strine’s move in In re Lear is discussed at infra note 210. 
 75. Even in the context of special litigation committee decisions which receive 
significantly less deference from Delaware courts than most board decisions, courts are to 
consider such prudential matters.  See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981). 
 76. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
719 (2007) (describing a fairly robust duty). 
 77. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“[A] conscious decision to refrain from acting may 
nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the 
[business judgment] rule.”). 
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care.78  More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that a claim 
that directors consciously disregarded known duties violates the duty of 
good faith, which itself sounds in the duty of loyalty.79  Whatever the 
nature of the claim, directors who did not take part in corporate decisions 
but consciously disregarded their duties may face liability. 
The potential for a duty-of-oversight derivative suit again poses a 
problem for balancing board authority with the need to enforce fiduciary 
duties.  And again, the demand requirement cum futility exception is 
designed to provide the solution.  But Aronson and its second prong cannot 
do any work when a derivative suit is based on the board’s failure to act.80  
As discussed earlier, Aronson first asked whether the board can be trusted 
to make an unbiased Demand Decision.  It then applied a once-removed 
test based on the applicability of the business judgment rule to the Original 
Decision.  In cases of board non-action, however, the second Aronson 
prong will always fail because there can have been no valid business 
judgment regarding the board action when there was no board action. 
Because Aronson’s second prong cannot be an effective test for 
demand futility when the board does not act, the Delaware Supreme Court 
had to develop a new one.  In doing so, the court simply returned to the 
fundamental question the Aronson prongs were originally intended to 
represent—are these directors too biased to make an independent Demand 
Decision?81 
After Rales, Delaware courts do not apply Aronson’s two prongs when 
the basis for the derivative suit involves (1) a business decision made by a 
board, a majority of whose members have been replaced, (2) a non-decision 
by the board or (3) a decision made by the board of another company.82  In 
such cases, the question of demand futility turns on the generalized 
question of “whether [there is] a reasonable doubt that . . . the board of 
directors could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested 
 78. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 559, 595-97 (2008). 
 79. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).  For a discussion of the relative 
merits of characterizing a duty-to-monitor claim as a duty of care or duty of loyalty claim, 
see Bainbridge et al., supra note 78.  See also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. 
Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007) (arguing that 
good faith claims fit along a broader continuum of fiduciary duty cases). 
 80. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“Technically speaking [the business judgment rule] 
has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious 
decision, failed to act.”). 
 81. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 934 (“[I]t is appropriate . . . to examine whether the board 
that would be addressing the demand can impartially consider its merits without being 
influenced by improper considerations.”). 
 82. Id. 
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business judgment in responding to a demand.”83  This is essentially the 
first principle behind Aronson, but without the two-pronged test.84 
The test established by Rales turns on whether the basis for the 
complaint “renders any of the directors ‘interested’ and, if so, whether any 
of the other directors are compromised in their ability to act independently 
of the interested directors.”85  Assuming disinterestedness and 
independence regarding the Original Decision, demand futility under Rales 
boils down to whether directors face a substantial likelihood of personal 
liability.86  As in the case of board action, this likelihood of personal 
liability can be significantly affected by the presence of an exculpatory 
clause.87  If an exculpatory clause exists in the corporation’s charter, there 
can only be a substantial likelihood of directors’ personal liability to the 
extent the suit involves a non-exculpated claim.88  Accordingly, duty of 
care claims will not be sufficient to cast the specter of potential liability.89  
Instead, shareholders would have to allege non-exculpable claims—
breaches of the duty of loyalty or good faith.90 
Rales, by reverting back to the principle underlying Aronson, likely 
does its balancing job more simply and clearly than Aronson.  Along this 
line, Chancellor Lamb has noted: 
It has been observed that [Rales’s] simple and straightforward 
inquiry would seem to be the very issue that Aronson, in its more 
mechanical and roundabout way, was intended to resolve.  
Moreover, because this formulation is one of general application 
(and can as easily be applied in the business judgment rule 
context addressed in Aronson), it is arguable that the current state 
of the law is conceptually inverted and that it would be both 
simpler and more direct to regard the original Aronson analysis 
as a subpart of the more generally applicable and flexible 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500 (describing the similarities between the two tests). 
 85. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 928 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 86. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 936 (“In such circumstances, a director cannot be expected 
to exercise his or her independent business judgment without being influenced by the 
adverse personal consequences resulting from the decision.”).  Again, it may be that demand 
should be considered futile in cases beyond those in which a substantial threat of liability (in 
addition to self-interest and non-independence) is present.  See supra notes 54 and 
accompanying text.  Nevertheless, it appears that, at least in the Rales line of cases, that is 
not an open issue at this point. 
 87. See, e.g., In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. S’holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1269-70 (Del. Ch. 
1995) (noting the firm’s certificate of incorporation had precluded the imposition of liability 
on the directors). 
 88. See id. at 1270 (explaining that the pleadings must include non-exculpated 
conduct). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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principle set forth in Rales. 91 
Because it establishes a principle and is less specific than Aronson’s 
prongs, the Rales test can adapt to the introduction of exculpatory clauses 
and therefore does a better job of protecting board authority over litigation 
decisions. 
As a final point on board authority, consider the strong bias view 
discussed earlier.  On this view, almost no board can be expected to judge a 
shareholder demand fairly and, therefore, any demand is futile.  Aronson’s 
second prong may make sense if the strong bias view prevails.  Even if the 
strong bias view is not attractive, it may be that boards are generally 
incapable of fairly judging demand in respect of certain kinds of derivative 
suits.  This is, after all, the notion behind Aronson’s first prong and its 
concern for board independence and disinterest.  In between these two 
views of board bias, one expansive and one rather limited, a third may 
explain the differences between Aronson and Rales as they relate to board 
authority.  Rales and Aronson can be reconciled if boards are less likely to 
judge demand fairly when the derivative claim relates to past board action 
(keeping in mind that the board is exculpated from such claims in the 
relevant situation) than they are when the claim relates to something the 
board never did.  Perhaps varying degrees of director embarrassment or a 
greater inability to come to terms with mistakes actively made could justify 
Aronson’s second prong. 
Suffice it to say that this rationalization of Aronson’s second prong 
has received little attention to this point.  It may very well be that their sins 
of commission are more troubling to directors than their sins of omission.  
However, as discussed below in Part IV.C, passive directors have come 
under increased criticism in corporate governance circles.  Thus, if there is 
a different psychological aspect to Rales versus Aronson cases, it is 
certainly less pronounced than before. 
IV. DEMAND FUTILITY AND OVERDELEGATION 
While the Aronson test may be “conceptually inverted”92 and may fail 
to appropriately protect board authority in certain cases, when juxtaposed 
with the Rales standard it also gives boards a reason to delegate more 
decisions to subordinates than it might otherwise.  If Rales is a more 
director-friendly standard, then removing the board from corporate 
decisions will assure the most advantageous litigation posture for directors. 
 91. Kohls v. Duthie, 791 A.2d 772, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 2000) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 92. Kohls, 791 A.2d at 781. 
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A.  Overdelegation 
Imagine a director of Company A.  She likely has another full-time 
position,93 and may even serve on other corporate boards.94  She and her 
fellow directors do not have the time to make or consider every decision 
that Company A needs to make.  Collectively, they probably do not even 
have the time to make or consider every material decision that must be 
made.  To a large extent, they must delegate some decision-making 
authority to management.95 
Nevertheless, whether out of a sense of duty, fear of personal liability 
for breaches of fiduciary duties, or fear of reputational damage (or some 
combination of all three), she would like to be involved in the decision-
making process.  Recent regulations push her in this direction by requiring 
a certain amount of her involvement in Company A’s operations.96  This 
active participation can involve (1) direct decision-making or (2) 
monitoring delegates.97  Delegation with monitoring may itself mean 
delegation to management with the board monitoring management’s 
performance or delegation to a committee of directors which may or may 
not further delegate to (and thereafter monitor) management.98 
Where does she draw the line as to which classes of decisions require 
direct board action and which classes should be delegated?  Potential 
liability will certainly play a role in this calculus.  At the motion to dismiss 
stage and thereafter, directors are protected by the business judgment rule 
for decisions made in their managerial capacity.  But, if litigation proceeds 
to that point, there are significant incentives for the board to settle even if 
 93. See, e.g., Elizabeth Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 482-84 
(2007) (“Typical directors of Fortune 500 companies are usually either current officers of 
large businesses or former officers who are currently holding other board of consulting 
positions.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Abigail Aims, 2005 Trends in Corporate Governance Practices of the 100 
Largest U.S. Public Companies, 1523 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. 223, 247 (2006) (charting the 
number of directors of the Top 100 companies who serve on other boards). 
 95. See, e.g., DOOLEY supra note 23, at 182-83 (explaining that management and 
policymaking are truly executive functions). 
 96. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.03 (2004) and NASD Rule 
4350(c)(2) (2006) (requiring independent directors to meet in regular sessions without 
inside directors); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.05 (2004) and NASD Rule 
4350(c)(3)(A), 4350(c)(4)(A) (2006) (requiring board action in respect to compensation 
decisions); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m), NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.07(a) 
(2004) and NASD Rule 4350(d) (2006) (requiring action by members of the board’s audit 
committee). 
 97. See Jill Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268-75 (1997) 
(describing the distinction between a “monitoring” board and a “managerial” board). 
 98. For a committee decision to qualify as a board “non-decision” and therefore qualify 
for Rales treatment, the committee must consist of less than half of the members of the 
board at the time demand would otherwise be required.  See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 353. 
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the derivative suit has little chance for ultimate success.99  Also, if the 
litigation proceeds past the motion to dismiss stage, the corporation is 
likely to incur significant legal costs aside from settlement costs. 
As discussed above, directors are further insulated from litigation risk 
by the demand requirement.  This should provide our director with a 
significant level of comfort, as long as she can be reasonably sure that 
demand will not be deemed futile.  In addition to the significant timing 
advantages offered by the demand requirement, it may offer other 
procedural advantages (discussed in Part V.B below) for her attempts to 
stymie any derivative suit.  Consequently, when deciding how to act as a 
board it should be of no small importance that demand be required, i.e. not 
futile, should a derivative suit challenging the corporate action (or inaction) 
be filed. 
Under Rales, the relevant question for demand purposes will be 
whether or not there is a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board 
could properly exercise its independent and disinterested business 
judgment in responding to demand.100  Crucially, in the case of a board 
delegating corporate decisions about which the directors have no personal 
interest and are otherwise independent-minded, the key to that question will 
be whether the corporation has an exculpatory clause and, if so, whether 
the claimed breach is exculpable.101  If the alleged breach is covered by an 
exculpatory clause, demand will be required because Delaware courts 
recognize no cognizable interest disabling the directors from making the 
Demand Decision. 
Contrast that result with the situation had the directors not delegated 
and instead made a full (or at least majority) board decision regarding the 
matters.  Because there had been board action, demand would be judged 
under Aronson.  In the case of a decision about which the directors have no 
personal interest and are otherwise independent-minded and where the 
company has an exculpatory clause that covers any claim, demand will still 
be potentially futile under Aronson’s second prong if plaintiffs successfully 
plead a due care breach.  Sufficiently pleading a duty of care claim with 
particularity is difficult, but not nearly impossible.  Thus, if boards rely on 
the demand requirement to protect them from derivative litigation, 
delegation will be preferable to direct management in these circumstances. 
One important limitation on these incentives could be the capacity of 
directors to otherwise effectively mitigate litigation risk.  The analysis 
 99. See supra notes 23 and accompanying text. 
 100. Rales, 634 A.2d at 934. 
 101. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text; Desimone, 924 A.2d at 935-36.  
Regarding exculpability, delegation may present the question of whether Caremark duties, 
and therefore the duty of good faith, have been violated.  See infra Part V.A (discussing the 
Caremark duties in the case of delegation). 
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above assumes that majority board involvement cannot be expected to 
significantly reduce the number of decisions about which shareholders will 
colorably complain in duty of care derivative suits.  If this were not the 
case—that is, if boards could by their very involvement in decision-
making, greatly reduce duty of care litigation—boards, despite recognizing 
the demand-related advantages provided by Rales, might still expect the 
benefits of full board activity to outweigh those advantages.  An ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure, particularly considering the non-
litigation costs (e.g., reputation costs) that can be incurred when decisions 
turn out poorly.  At the very least, directors might feel confident enough in 
the merits of the case to avoid incurring settlement costs and might expect 
to be able to cut litigation off before other significant costs are incurred. 
But what level of comfort can directors reach regarding the risk of 
prospective duty of care litigation?  Will there be colorable duty of care 
claims despite their direct participation?  The answer is almost certainly 
yes, keeping in mind that directors do not ask themselves whether they can 
prevent ultimately meritorious litigation by actively participating in 
corporate decision-making.  The relevant issue instead, is the level of costs 
associated with all potential litigation (including distraction, settlement 
costs, and litigation fees), and whether they can be minimized or avoided 
by active director participation in the original decision-making process. 
Directors’ most significant protection from potential duty of care 
litigation is the combination of the pleading requirements of Chancery Rule 
23.1 and the business judgment rule.  Under Rule 23.1’s pleading 
requirements, plaintiffs must plead particular facts that show demand 
would be futile.102  This is generally understood to be a significant 
procedural burden.103  All the while, these heightened pleading standards 
exist against the backdrop of the business judgment rule.  In this regard, 
some scholars characterize the current standard for due care liability as 
requiring “little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration of 
relevant data.”104  On the other hand, others believe that a certain level of 
 102. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1 (requiring the plaintiff to allege “reasons for the plaintiff’s 
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (“What 
the pleader must set forth are particularized factual statements that are essential to the 
claim.”) (citations omitted). 
 103. DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1.  But see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 268 (Hartnett, J. concurring) 
(“The reason for Rule 23.1 is judicial economy.  It is not intended to preclude a judicial 
inquiry where the pleaded facts, if true, and any inferences that may be drawn from them . . . 
show the likelihood of misconduct by the directors.”).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
relative burdens created by Rule 23.1 and notice pleading under Rule 8(a), see Part V.B 
infra. 
 104. Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
589, 591 (2006); see also Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Due care in the decision-making 
context is process due care only.”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (“Disney IV”), 
907 A.2d 693, 749-50 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[C]ompliance with a director’s duty of care can 
  
2009] BOARD AUTHORITY AND OVERDELEGATION 727 
 
 
substantive egregiousness will suffice to result in a violation of fiduciary 
duties.105 
The fuzziness of the scope of the duty of care is but one example of 
the indeterminacy of Delaware corporate law.106  But even if directors 
knew for certain that due care required, for example, only the “ritualistic 
consideration of relevant data,” what are the contours of the ritual, and 
what data is relevant?  As Ehud Kamar has observed: 
[C]orporate law is not an exact science.  Rather, it is a set of 
loosely defined guidelines made concrete by courts after the fact.  
The messages the guidelines carry, in general, is that corporate 
fiduciaries simply must do their utmost to promote shareholder 
interests.  Exactly what this means in practice is not clear.  
Although court decisions list relevant criteria for judging 
managerial behavior, these criteria are not exhaustive.  Indeed, 
courts often emphasize their incompleteness, leaving the legal 
community wondering what additional criteria may prove 
relevant in the future.107 
Delaware courts’ decisions (including duty of care decisions) are 
extremely fact-sensitive.108  Despite the best of intentions, they are likely 
subject to considerable hindsight bias.109  Accordingly, it is exceedingly 
difficult to be sure that colorable litigation will not crop up prior to 
deciding whether to take an active role in making corporate decisions.110 
Prudent directors, therefore, need not assume that board diligence 
would necessarily insulate them from duty of care claims, even with the 
protection of the business judgment rule.  In the face of even a slightly 
indeterminate litigation risk and the magnitude of liability risk relative to 
never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board 
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of good faith or rationality 
of the process employed.”) (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967). 
 105. See Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 320. 
 106. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment:  A Theory of Rhetoric in 
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005) (describing the way in which the 
Delaware courts’ interpretation of “good faith” shifts over time in response to, inter alia, 
political pressures). 
 107. Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 887, 891 (1999). 
 108. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1915 (1998) (describing Delaware decisions as 
involving “loosely defined legal tests whose precise meaning depends on the particular facts 
of each case.”). 
 109. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 547 (8th ed. 2000) (explaining the hindsight bias). 
 110. To these questions of indeterminacy, one should add the directors’ recognition 
(from a combination of modesty and awareness of time demands) that they might make 
procedural mistakes. 
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their personal net worth, directors are likely to be cautious.111  Similarly, 
excessive directorial caution may stem from recognition of the costs 
imposed on the firm through litigation, even if such litigation does not 
result in success for plaintiffs.  One would expect the differences between 
the demand futility tests in Aronson and Rales to allow directors a device 
for mitigating some of this risk—the relative advantage of delegation and 
monitoring vis-à-vis direct board decision-making. 
B. Overdelegation at Work 
Although there are multiple decision classes for which such delegation 
may make sense, executive compensation may be a particularly good 
example.  First, delegation of certain compensation matters to board 
compensation committees is required or encouraged by the stock exchanges 
already.  The New York Stock Exchange requires its listed companies to 
establish compensation committees comprised of independent directors and 
charge them with, at a minimum, reviewing and approving CEO goals and 
objectives relevant to his or her compensation, evaluating his or her 
performance in light thereof and, “either as a committee or together with 
the other independent directors (as directed by the board), determin[ing] 
and approv[ing] the CEO's compensation level based on this evaluation.”112  
For non-CEO compensation, incentive-compensation and equity plan 
decisions, however, the compensation committee needs only “make 
recommendations” to the board.113  Boards, of course, are free to require 
that a compensation committee do more than merely “recommend.”  
Nasdaq companies, on the other hand, do not need to have compensation 
committees, but must either have a compensation committee comprised of 
independent directors or involve a majority of independent directors in 
compensation decisions.114  Moreover, whatever form the decision-making 
body takes, its role need only be advisory.115  Again, however, a board is 
free to require that a committee take on more responsibility. 
Although not required, delegation by boards is advantageous given the 
tests of Aronson and Rales.  The independence of compensation 
gatekeepers means that management compensation (as distinct from board 
 111. See Kamar, supra note 107, at 895-96.  One way corporate law mitigates this 
potentially excessive caution is through director indemnification and insurance. 
 112. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A(5) (2004). 
 113. Id.  Compensation committees must also produce the compensation report that is to 
be included in the corporation’s proxy statement. 
 114. NASDAQ, Manual, Rule 5605(d)(2009). 
 115. See id. (requiring the decision-maker to determine or recommend compensation to 
the board for determination).  With respect to CEO compensation, a committee may make 
recommendations to the full board which may then decide the CEO’s compensation, as long 
as the CEO takes no part in the deliberations.  Id. 
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compensation) is not likely to pose serious duty of loyalty issues.116  Thus, 
the majority of derivative suits in the executive compensation context 
generally fall into three categories.  When a majority of the board acts, 
shareholders bring due care or waste claims against the board.117  When the 
board delegates to a committee, shareholders bring care or waste claims 
against committee members and, perhaps, oversight claims against the 
board.  When the board or committee delegates to management, 
shareholders bring oversight claims against the delegating body and, 
perhaps, duty of loyalty claims against management.118  In the first type, 
claims against the board for board action, demand futility is evaluated 
under Aronson.  In the second and third types, claims against the committee 
based on its decision or against the board or committee based on its failure 
to monitor demand futility is evaluated under Rales.119 
Consider the Chancery Court’s recent decision in Desimone v. 
Barrows.  Shareholders of Sycamore Networks brought a derivative suit 
alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty by the board relating to the 
backdating of stock options awarded to employees and directors.120  The 
 116. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 44, at 577-78 (“[Showing of financial interest] 
requires facts that would support . . . a taint of conflict of interest, facts that are more likely 
to be present in closely held companies than in public corporations.  Many public 
corporations have compensation committees comprised mostly, if not exclusively, of 
disinterested outside directors.”).  As noted earlier, new exchange rules now require that 
publicly traded corporations have compensation committees comprised exclusively of 
disinterested directors. 
 117. See id. at 581 (examining the difficulties for shareholders when bringing breach of 
duty of care and waste claims in executive compensation suits).  Recently, these complaints 
have also raised good faith claims.  See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 
(“Disney V”), 906 A.2d 27, 46 (Del. 2006) (explaining that the duties to use due care and to 
act in good faith are distinct); see also infra Part V.A (extensively discussing good faith). 
 118. See, e.g., Desimone, 924 A.2d at 933.  In addition to suing a delegating 
compensation committee, shareholders may allege breach of oversight duties against, for 
example, an audit committee for not recognizing potential backdating risks.  Id. at 940. 
 119. For a committee decision to qualify as a board “non-decision” and therefore qualify 
for Rales treatment, the committee must consist of less than half of the members of the 
board at the time demand would otherwise be required.  See Ryan v. Gifford 918 A.2d 341, 
353 & n. 29 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Where at least one half or more of the board in place at the 
time the complaint was filed approved the underlying challenged transactions, which 
approval may be imputed to the entire board for purposes of proving demand futility, the 
Aronson test applies.”). 
 120. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 912-13.  Backdating involves the issuance of options with 
exercise prices below the market price of a share at the time of actual grant.  If done 
explicitly, granting “in the money” options would violate prohibitions imposed by 
shareholder-approved stock plans and would have negative consequences under the tax laws 
and accounting rules.  See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000); Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123: Share-Based Payment (revised 2004) 
(hereinafter “FAS 123R”), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf.  Backdating 
achieves the same economic effect as in-the-money options but avoids such consequences 
by pretending the date of grant was really at an earlier time when the share price was equal 
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option grants in question were divided among three groups of recipients, 
including rank-and-file employees and officers.121  Importantly, the 
shareholders conceded that because of delegation no board action was 
taken with respect to any of the grants and that, consequently, Rales was 
the appropriate test for their demand futility claim.122 
The Chancery Court analyzed the employee grants and the officer 
grants separately.  With respect to the former, no directors were 
substantively interested or non-independent; therefore, the only question 
under Rales was whether the directors faced a substantial threat of personal 
liability as a result of the backdating.123  The employee grants had not been 
made by the board or compensation committee, but were instead made by 
an executive to whom the compensation committee was assumed to have 
delegated authority.124  Because the directors were not directly involved, 
the only claim available to shareholders was that the directors failed in their 
duty to oversee the executive to whom they entrusted the power to make 
the grants.125  The court concluded that no substantial likelihood of 
personal liability under Caremark existed when there were no allegations 
that the board knew a problem existed and failed to take remedial actions to 
curtail the executive’s behav 126
The court’s analysis of the officer grants is more interesting.  The 
shareholders did not allege that directors knowingly backdated the officer 
grants.127  However, the court did infer that the compensation committee 
approved the amount and recipients of the officer grants.128  But it refused 
to infer that the committee “was involved in the mechanics by which the 
options were issued or the dates on which that administrative task was 
carried out.”129  In addition, the court concluded that there would be no 
reason to doubt the other directors’ abilities to judge demand fairly, even if 
the compensation committee members had breached their fiduciary 
to the desired exercise price.  The complaint also alleged “spring-loading” and “bullet-
dodging”—practices which, alternatively, time grants so that they occur in advance of 
positive news or time grants so that they occur following negative news.  Desimone, 924 
A.2d at 915-17. 
 121. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 913.  The third group of recipients was non-employee 
directors.  Id. 
 122. Id. at 913-14.  The board apparently delegated option-granting power to the 
compensation committee for the employee and officer grants, and the non-employee director 
grants were self-executing as per the equity plan.  Id. at 949. 
 123. Id. at 938. 
 124. Id. at 938-39. 
 125. Id. at 939. 
 126. See id. at 940 (applying a post-Stone v. Ritter Caremark analysis).  For a detailed 
description of Caremark duties, see Part V.A infra. 
 127. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 942. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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duties.130  These other directors took no part in the granting of options.  As 
for any duty of oversight claims against the non-committee directors, the 
court summarily dismissed the idea, presumably because a board delegates 
to a committee specifically to avoid any substantial oversight 
responsibility.131  Thus, the board that avoids managing the option-granting 
process by delegating the job to a committee (which, in this case, delegated 
the job to management) found itself well protected by Rales and the 
limitations inherent in the duty of oversight. 
But imagine an alternative world in which the Sycamore board was 
more significantly involved in the mechanics of issuing the officer grants.  
On the one hand, the directors could have prevented backdating had they 
been actively involved.  On the other hand, if the backdating nevertheless 
occurred, demand would have been judged under Aronson rather than 
Rales.  Director involvement provides both risk and reward from a 
litigation perspective. 
To determine whether this matters, one might want to know how a 
more active compensation committee or board could have allowed options 
to be manipulated.  First, they may have been complicit in the 
manipulation.  Perhaps the board wanted officers to receive higher 
compensation than the circumstances would otherwise allow.132  
Backdating, for instance, would allow payments to be made to the officers 
without their full cost appearing in the corporation’s financial statements.133  
Under these circumstances, the board would need to be involved in the 
option granting to guarantee the backdating, so any differences between 
Rales and Aronson are beside the point. 
Alternatively, the active directors could make a mistake.  They may 
misunderstand the accounting rules, not receive enough information 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 35-36 
(describing outrage costs—imposed by shareholders, press, politicians and the public at 
large—as a meaningful constraint on directors transferring wealth from the corporation to 
executives).  Bebchuk and Fried note that the directors’ motivation for making these high 
payments run the gamut from the tangible—preserving their seat on the board—to the 
intangible—being a “team player” within the corporate hierarchy.  Id. at 25-34. 
 133. For the seminal article on this form of “secret” compensation, see Iman Anabtawi, 
Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835 (2004).  See also Opinion 25: Accounting for 
Stock Issued to Employees (Accounting Principles Board 1972); ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK 
BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting 
Standards Bd. 1995). Under FAS 123R, the balance sheet benefit of backdating for 
accounting purposes is only the incremental share price increase from the alleged date of 
grant to the actual date of grant.  Under prior accounting rules, the benefit was more 
dramatic because companies took no compensation charge for options that were granted at- 
or out-of-the-money.  Thus, backdating allowed companies to remove the entire cost of the 
options from their financial statements.  ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK BASED COMPENSATION, 
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1995). 
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regarding the accounting and tax implications of backdating, not receive 
enough factual information regarding the option grants, or simply make a 
terrible error in judgment.  In any of these cases, there would seem to be a 
colorable due care claim,134 and there would be a significant risk that 
demand would be excused under Aronson’s second prong.  As long as the 
possibility of director error or ex post judicial error exists, then, Aronson’s 
second prong invites directors to delegate decisions away. 
Desimone was not the only option backdating case to be decided in 
recent years by Delaware courts.  The Chancery Court had two other cases 
before it alleging improper manipulation of equity awards.  In both Ryan v. 
Gifford and In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, defendant 
directors moved to dismiss the respective derivative suits for failure to 
make a demand.135  In both Ryan and Tyson, the motion was denied.136  
Finally, in both Ryan and Tyson, the boards had taken action regarding 
equity awards that formed the basis of the complaints.137  Admittedly, Ryan 
and Tyson involved allegations of intentional disloyalty by the board, 
neither of which was alleged with any particularity in Desimone, even with 
respect to the compensation committee members themselves.138  We should 
expect directors who are lining their own pockets or those of their friends 
to be treated more harshly than those who seem only asleep at the wheel.  
Nevertheless, it may seem to some that board inaction fares better in 
litigation than does board action.  One cannot help thinking that directors or 
their advisers who think about these cases are likely to see the litigation 
advantages to be gained by delegating authority over such decisions.139 
C. The Managerial Board 
If Rales and Aronson combine to promote overdelegation, the question 
remains whether increased delegation by boards is problematic.  Much 
recent corporate law commentary recommends that directors play a greater 
role in the corporate decision-making process.140  Of course, board 
 134. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra  note 1, at 275-83. 
 135. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d at 351-52 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. 
Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 583 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 136. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354-55; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 583-84. 
 137. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 353 (noting that “one half of the current board members 
approved each challenged transaction”); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 573-79.  See also Ryan, 918 
A.2d at 355-56 (stating that the Chancery Court also judged demand futility under Rales and 
determined that demand would have been excused even under that test because a majority of 
the board members faced a substantial risk of personal liability). 
 138. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 929-30 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 139. As in Desimone, the delegation need not be full.  It need only be a delegation of the 
part of the process carrying a high litigation risk, in this case, the “mechanics” of the option 
granting. 
 140. See, e.g., Eric A. Reitman, Panacea Later: A Critical Evaluation of the Board 
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involvement in that process can mean different things.  On the one hand, 
the full board can actively make decisions over certain spheres of corporate 
activity.  On the other hand, the full board can delegate to management and 
thereafter monitor management’s performance.  In between, the board can 
delegate authority over certain activities to committees of the board, which 
must then make separate determinations as to retaining the authority or 
delegating it further to management.141  Advocating for a more active board 
does not commit one to the view that boards should not ever delegate. 
In fact, there are reasons to think that delegation of either type—to 
committees or to management—can be a good thing.  A certain amount of 
delegation to management is necessary for the efficient operation of a large 
firm.142  Moreover, as corporations have increasingly turned to independent 
directors, delegation to management may be desirable if independent 
directors lack the firm-specific information needed to manage 
effectively.143  As for committees, their use allows boards to select 
decision-makers who may bring expertise in specialized areas.144  
Moreover, although independent directors on these committees may suffer 
from informational deficiencies relative to corporate insiders, they will 
likely suffer less than the other directors from managerial capture.145 
While delegation (and monitoring) may be an appropriate role for 
Orthodoxy in Corporate Governance Scholarship and Proposal of a Board-less Alternative 
for the Diffusely Owned Public Corporation, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239 (2006) (observing 
and criticizing the central role that board action plays in corporate governance scholarship).  
For a selection of just the most recent scholars to assume or explicitly state that directors 
should be more involved in some level of corporate decision-making, see, e.g., Elizabeth 
Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform: Independence or Democracy, 
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2007); Eric M. Fogel and Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the 
House:  Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 33, 67-71 (2007) (arguing for the establishment of shareholder-directors who will 
become more involved in monitoring management); Nowicki, supra note 93, at 481-90 
(suggesting the employment of “professional directors” as a means of better corporate 
governance). 
 141. As noted above, stock exchanges have begun to require or encourage the use by 
listed companies of certain board committees. 
 142. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974).  Also refer 
to Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: The Means to What End?, 52 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534 (1984) (describing the efficiency costs imposed by board 
involvement). 
 143. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 283. 
 144. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Shiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting 
Scandals, 48 J.L. & ECON. 371, 394-96 (2005) (discussing the impact of accounting 
expertise on board audit committees). 
 145. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Peter D. Favorite, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
Future of the Legal Profession: Considering a Role for Independent Directors, 32 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 577, 609 (2001); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of 
Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1283, 1291 (1998). 
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most boards with respect to most decisions, it is not necessarily true that all 
boards should delegate all decisions.  Boards may very well have a 
managing function in addition to a monitoring function, which includes, 
inter alia, strategic planning, reviewing the structure of significant 
corporate transactions and making compensation decisions.146  Some of 
these functions are practically non-delegable, regardless of the incentives 
created by the demand requirement.147  Others, like CEO compensation, are 
more or less subject to forced delegation.148  Between the two extremes, 
however, lies a broad swath of corporate decision-making in respect of 
which directors may decide whether or not to delegate their authority.149 
Left to their own devices, we can expect a fair amount of 
heterogeneity as boards come to different conclusions as to how best to 
strike the balance between managing and monitoring.  However, Aronson 
and Rales combine to provide an exogenous push towards delegation with 
subsequent monitoring.  Incentives to deviate from a particular board’s 
management/delegation baseline towards more delegation should give one 
pause.  A board’s decision to fully delegate to management and exclusively 
adopt a monitoring role may not always be optimal.  Monitoring by outside 
directors is likely to be imperfect and may provide management with the 
breathing room in which to make decisions that fail to maximize firm 
value.  The non-litigation advantages of delegation may often outweigh the 
advantages of board decision-making.  But unless that is always the case, 
the incentives created by the differing demand regimes toward more 
delegation will cause some amount of harm. 
There are at least some reasons to suspect that it is not the case that 
board delegation will always be the best decision.  As a response to the 
regulatory requirements discussed above, committees established by boards 
tend to consist solely of independent directors.150  These independent 
directors are less likely to have the most extensive information regarding a 
corporation.  Accordingly, they may not be capable of making the best 
decisions for the corporation in certain contexts.151  Alternatively, increased 
 146. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 272-74 (“Board function need not be viewed solely in 
terms of monitoring management.”) 
 147. Consider approval of a dissolution where a board was comprised of solely 
disinterested directors. 
 148. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 285 (noting that the appropriate management role of 
boards may extend past non-delegable duties for certain firms in certain circumstances). 
 150. Boards seeking to delegate to committees to take advantage of Rales outside of the 
contexts proscribed by regulations could certainly establish ad hoc committees consisting, in 
part, of inside directors. 
 151. An obvious example of this phenomenon can be observed with respect to 
compensation committee decisions relative to executives with whom the committee has 
little interaction or over whom the committee has less regular oversight. 
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usage of committees may cause resentment and antagonism on boards, 
impairing the ability of boards to operate optimally.152  Moreover, larger 
groups (such as boards) may perform better than smaller groups (like 
committees) or individuals.153 
Finally, even if delegation and subsequent monitoring were always 
advisable, many of the activities that traditionally fall within “monitoring” 
require some board action.154  Good monitoring will often require board 
decision-making,155 particularly when the monitor needs to express 
disapproval of the delegate’s actions and effect a change of course.  Thus, 
Aronson’s second prong may even provide monitors with incentive to 
delegate more and monitor less. 
V. OBJECTIONS 
This Article has contended that (1) Aronson’s second prong allocates 
authority away from the board even in instances where Delaware courts 
have not traditionally viewed a board as compromised and (2) when 
combined with the different test for demand futility in Rales, that second 
prong provides incentives for rational boards to take a less active role in 
corporate decision-making than they might have otherwise. 
The latter argument—that Aronson and Rales combine to create 
incentives for overdelegation—invites at least two critiques.  First, it may 
be that boards’ incentives to delegate have been diminished by recent 
Delaware jurisprudence announcing directors’ obligations to act in good 
faith.  Good faith is a prerequisite for coverage under exculpatory statutes, 
and therefore key to evaluating the likelihood of potential director liability 
under Rales.  If excessive delegation leads to an absence of good faith,156 
then this line of cases may provide a practical solution to the 
overdelegation problem. 
 152. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance 
Committee:  Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 
DUKE L.J. 517, 544 (2003). 
 153. See Bainbridge supra note 21, at 42-43 (discussing advantages of large boards 
versus small boards). 
 154. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 270-71 (“Recent efforts to improve board monitoring 
have included revising director qualification standards to encourage greater use of directors 
without relationships that could interfere with independent action . . . Committees are 
particularly useful for effecting board monitoring because they allow independent directors 
to make decisions free from the risk of domination by insiders.”) (emphasis added). 
 155. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate 
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1064 (1993) (“Monitoring the 
performance of senior executives is the board's major function, but that necessarily involves 
activities that can best be described as managing the corporation.”). 
 156. See Nowicki, supra note 93 (noting the danger in conflating “not in good faith” 
with “bad faith”). 
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The second criticism applies to both the board authority and 
overdelegation points.  One might agree that the demand requirement 
provides incentives for boards to delegate away more of their authority than 
they would otherwise choose.  One might further agree that Aronson’s 
second prong fails to give enough deference to board authority in 
circumstances where they are unlikely to face personal liability.  
Nevertheless, one might point out that the demand requirement is only one 
part of the litigation process.  The subsequent (and sometimes 
simultaneous) step—a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)—allows a 
board protected by an exculpatory clause to move for dismissal and nip any 
litigation in the bud, even if demand is excused under Aronson’s second 
prong.  Thus the exculpatory clause may still provide an effective safety net 
for the directors just beyond the demand stage.  If so, this would eliminate 
any practical differences between the decision-making board and the 
delegating board regarding demand futility and would minimize any 
incursion on board authority. 
A. Good Faith as a Check on Overdelegation 
Key to the overdelegation analysis in Part IV is the idea that the Rales 
test provides a relatively safe landing spot for boards who delegated away 
decision-making authority over a broad array of decisions.  Under the Rales 
test, and assuming no obvious director interest or non-independence with 
respect to the underlying matter, demand is excused only when directors 
face a substantial likelihood of personal liability.  Considering the ubiquity 
of exculpatory clauses, this requires that shareholders allege with 
particularity that directors have breached their duty of good faith.157  If 
overdelegation demonstrates an absence of good faith, then directors would 
not be protected by the exculpation statute.  Consequently, the Rales test 
would be satisfied and board delegation would not receive preferential 
treatment for demand futility purposes. 
In Delaware, directors owe shareholders a duty of oversight, i.e. a duty 
to monitor subordinates.  Chancellor Allen first outlined the modern 
version of this duty in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation.  Prior to Caremark, the duty of oversight was invoked only 
when directors had cause to suspect that management or employees were 
involved in illicit or harmful behavior.158  To some extent, ignorance was 
 157. Loyalty claims to the extent distinct from good faith claims would also qualify to 
make directors personally liable. 
 158. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[A]bsent 
a cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate 
system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”). 
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bliss.159  Caremark retreated from that limited conception of a board’s 
oversight responsibility.  The duty of oversight would always be “active” 
but would only be violated by a sustained or systematic failure of the board 
to exercise oversight.160  A failure to oversee rises to that level if (1) no 
reporting system or controls was implemented or (2) the board consciously 
failed to monitor or oversee those systems that do exist.161  Chancellor 
Allen noted the high bar imposed by this standard, but observed:  “[A] 
demanding test of liability in the oversight context is probably beneficial to 
corporate shareholders as a class, as it is in the board decision context, 
since it makes board service by qualified persons more likely, while 
continuing to act as a stimulus to good faith performance of duty by such 
directors.”162 
Caremark was understood to be a duty-of-care case.163  Chancellor 
Allen did, however, use the phrase “good faith” in describing the duty of 
oversight and the test to be applied.  The use of “good faith” implicated 
Section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses, but Caremark did not specifically 
discuss the relationship between the duty of oversight and exculpation 
clauses.164  The issue was not relevant in the case because the court was 
deciding whether to approve a settlement that imposed no personal liability 
onto the directors.165 
The connection between oversight and good faith (and therefore 
Section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses) was first given significant judicial 
attention in the now-famous Disney litigation.166  Although the Disney 
directors were ultimately held to have satisfied their duties of good faith, 
the Disney cases made clear that a breach of the duty of oversight would 
not be exculpable under Section 102(b)(7) clauses because the duty of 
oversight was a species of the duty of good faith. 
 159. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 293-94 (advocating the “every dog gets one bite” 
rule, under which analogy the “dog” is management or other employees and the dog’s 
“owner” who won’t be liable to the first victim of the dog is the board) 
 160. See In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, at 971. 
 161. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, at 370 (approving the Caremark test). 
 162. Id. (emphasis omitted) 
 163. See supra note 78; Hill & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 841 and n. 36 (noting that 
Caremark characterized the question of good faith as “coming within the duty of care” and 
citing authority for that proposition). 
 164. Chancellor Allen did cite Baxter’s dismissal of a similar suit because of the 
existence of an exculpatory clause as support for his conclusion that the shareholders’ 
claims in Caremark “quite likely were susceptible to a motion to dismiss in all events.”  698 
A.2d 959, at 971, fn 28. 
 165. Id. at 960. 
 166. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 
1998) (“Disney I”); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Disney II”); In re Walt Disney Co., 2004 
WL 2050138 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Disney III”); Disney IV; and Disney V. 
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The facts of the Disney cases have been summarized more fully 
elsewhere but a brief summary will be helpful.167  Disney needed to hire a 
second-in-command to serve under CEO Michael Eisner and Eisner settled 
on Michael Ovitz.  According to its governing documents, Disney’s board 
was charged with appointing all officers, including the President (the 
position to be held by Ovitz).168  Furthermore, the compensation 
committee’s charter charged it with approving all compensation for the 
President and all employment contracts of Disney officers.169  Ovitz and the 
company negotiated a pay package (including very generous severance 
terms), the committee approved the package and the board elected Ovitz as 
President.  The committee’s approval and the board’s election occurred 
after a process that, according to the court, “fell significantly short of the 
best practices of ideal corporate governance.”170  Specifically, it was 
unclear until trial whether any of the Disney directors had quantified the 
severance potentially owed to Ovitz. 
Within a short period of time, Ovitz’ employment was terminated and 
he received the severance payment.  Shareholders filed a derivative suit 
claiming, inter alia, violations by the Disney directors of their duties of 
loyalty, due care and good faith.  A trial eventually ensued, after which 
Chancellor Chandler held that the directors had not breached any fiduciary 
duties.  The Delaware Supreme Court subsequently affirmed that decision 
in Disney V. 
The Disney V decision need not have spent much energy on a 
discussion of the duty of good faith.  As the court noted, the shareholders 
argued that the directors had acted in bad faith because they had acted 
without due care.171  The court agreed that the shareholders had not proven 
any violation of the duty of care, so they necessarily failed to prove bad 
faith.172 
Nevertheless, the court went on to outline the contours of the duty of 
good faith in dicta.  First and contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, mere lack 
of due care—gross negligence—was not enough to demonstrate an absence 
of good faith.173  Most importantly for present purposes, the court noted 
that the duty of good faith could be violated “where the fiduciary 
 167. See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 843-845 (reviewing the main facts in 
the Disney litigation). 
 168. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 771. 
 169. Id. at 763-64. 
 170. Id. at 697. 
 171. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 64-66.  The court recognized the need to distinguish due care from good faith 
based on the legislature’s passage of (1) § 102(b)(7) and (2) § 145(a) and (b) and the 
distinction those statutes make between acts taken in good faith and those taken in bad faith.  
For criticism of this approach, see Bainbridge et al., supra note 78, at 33-34. 
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intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for his duties.”174  Equating a conscious disregard of 
duties with an absence of good faith meant that a breach of the oversight 
duty (along with other conscious breaches) would not be exculpable under 
Section 102(b)(7) provisions. 
Soon after Disney V came the Supreme Court’s decision in Stone v. 
Ritter.  Stone was another case concerning an alleged breach of a board’s 
duty of good faith via the duty of oversight.  The court in Stone explicitly 
adopted the Caremark “sustained or systematic failure” standard for 
evaluating oversight liability, and went on to note that such a standard was 
fully consistent with the “conscious disregard of duties” standard set forth 
in Disney V. 175  In particular, Stone held that liability in the oversight 
context “requires a showing that directors knew that they were not 
discharging their fiduciary duties.”176 
In sum:  if directors violate their duty of oversight announced in the 
Caremark/Disney/Stone line of cases, they face a substantial likelihood of 
personal liability for oversight claims because they would not be 
exculpated for their lack of good faith.  Accordingly, one might think that 
Rales’ demand futility test provides no comfort for boards whose 
delegation created a colorable claim for breach of the oversight duty. 
Nevertheless, three considerations cut against that conclusion.  First, 
the delegation that is contemplated by the duty of oversight is delegation to 
management.  There does not seem to be a judicially recognized duty of the 
board to monitor a board committee.  Thus, the duty of oversight provides 
no disincentive for overdelegation to committees. 
Second, leaving committee delegation aside, directors may violate 
their good faith obligations by failing to monitor management to whom 
they delegate.  That does not mean that directors violate those obligations 
by failing to actively make decisions.  Delegation itself does not violate the 
duty of oversight—it merely activates it.  Considering the informational 
disadvantages they face relative to the actors they are supposed to oversee, 
we have reason to be concerned that boards will systematically fail to 
rigorously monitor management, even if that failure does not rise to a 
Caremark violation. 
Third, even if good oversight is difficult, directors have little reason to 
worry that shareholders will be able to meet the Caremark/Stone test.  
Indeed, one scholar described the standard announced in Caremark “more 
like a Potemkin village than a revolution,” “requir[ing] a showing of some 
extreme directorial misconduct when it c[omes] to monitoring the activities 
 174. See Disney V, at 67 (emphasis added) (quoting Chancellor Chandler’s language 
from Disney IV). 
 175. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369. 
 176. Id. at 370 (citing Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506). 
  
740 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
 
of subordinates.”177  Caremark duties are so hard to violate that there has 
been only one instance—an unpublished opinion—in which a Delaware 
court held directors liable for breach of the oversight duty.178 
In a slightly different context, the duty of good faith had been treated 
expansively by at least one court.  In Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co.,179 
Lyondell’s directors had approved a merger of the company with Basell 
AF, wherein Lyondell’s shareholders were cashed out for $13 billion, or 
$48 per share.  Lyondell’s shareholders sued, claiming breach of the duty 
of care and breach of the duty of loyalty, the latter on “good faith,” 
disclosure and “financial self-interest” grounds.180  As to due care, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the directors violated their Revlon duties181 by failing 
to actively take steps to ensure that the sales process would achieve the 
highest price available for the shareholders.182  Defendants countered that 
Lyondell’s charter contained an exculpation clause shielding directors from 
liability for due care breaches.183  Plaintiffs responded that the Revlon 
claims, which sounded in the duty of care, nonetheless implicated the duty 
of good faith (and were therefore non-exculpable) because the directors 
knew they were violating their Revlon duties.  In a somewhat surprising 
ruling,184 Vice Chancellor Noble denied the directors’ motion for summary 
judgment based on the exculpation clause because “[t]he record, as it 
 177. See Harry Gerla, Caremark — The Failed Revolution, 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/caremarkthe-failed-revolution.html. 
 178. See ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. 2006).  
In a recent opinion, Vice Chancellor Strine allowed an oversight claim to survive a motion 
to dismiss where the claim only involved a Caremark-type legal compliance issue.  See In re 
American Int’l Group, Inc., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).  
 179. Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., 2008 WL 2923427 (Del.Ch., July 29, 2008). 
 180. Id. at 1-3. 
 181. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986) (formulating the concept of Revlon duties that are owed in the context of mergers). 
 182. See Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427 at *1.  Plaintiffs also complained that the directors 
had adopted preclusive and coercive deal protection measures in violation of Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 
Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 183. Id. at *18. 
 184. See Posting of Jeff Lipshaw to Legal Profession Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2008/07/reactions-to-ry.html (July 31, 
2008) (reacting to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling in Ryan v. Lyondell); Eric 
Chiappinelli, Delaware Court of Chancery on Good Faith and the Duty of Loyalty in a 
Revlon Setting, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES:  NEW DEVELOPMENTS, 
http://businessentitiesonline.typepad.com/new_developments/2008/08/delaware-court.html 
(denouncing the ruling).  But see Gordon Smith, Boosters of “The Fiduciary Duty of Good 
Faith” Rejoice, THE CONGLOMERATE, Aug. 13, 2008,  
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/08/boosters-of-the.html (observing that Ryan was “a 
pretty safe and uncontroversial ruling”).  Additionally, under a relatively similar fact 
pattern, another member of the Chancery Court came down on the other side of the good 
faith issue.  See McPadden v. Sidhu, 2008 WL 4017052 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
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presently stands, does not, as a matter of undisputed material fact, 
demonstrate the Lyondell directors' good faith discharge of their Revlon 
duties—a known set of ‘duties’ requiring certain conduct or impeccable 
knowledge of the market in the face of Basell's offer to acquire the 
Company.”185 
Any expansion of good faith in Ryan was short-lived.  After taking an 
interlocutory appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled, among other 
things, that a good faith claim could be stated “[o]nly if [the board] 
knowingly and completely failed to undertake their responsibilities” and 
that the proper inquiry for a good faith claim is whether the board “utterly 
failed” to attempt to fulfill its duties.186  After Ryan, consider a board faced 
with a set of decisions having a high due-care risk profile—perhaps 
incentive compensation for non-CEO employees—.  Why not hand those 
decisions off to management?  The directors could theoretically be inviting 
a Caremark/Stone claim.  But the well-advised board might simply 
establish maximum limits on aggregate awards and might require 
management to comply with a minimal periodic reporting system. 
Under these circumstances, there would not be an “utter failure” to 
establish an oversight system.  And the minimal oversight system is not 
likely to show that the directors were consciously disabling themselves 
from being informed of risks that required their attention.  Exactly what 
risks required the directors’ attention?  Perhaps, in light of recent 
backdating scandals, directors should know that there is a serious 
accounting (and therefore securities fraud) risk in improperly administering 
stock compensation programs.  However, the Desimone decision indicates 
otherwise.  Shareholders there argued that the directors failed to oversee 
the executives to whom they delegated option-granting “mechanics,” at 
least for awards made to officers and employees.  The Chancery Court held 
that the failure to oversee the executives was not a violation of good faith, 
in part because the court refused to infer that directors knew that options 
were being backdated.187  It was not enough to allege failure to oversee in 
the context of the general risk posed by equity grants.  Instead, to satisfy 
the Caremark/Stone standard, the ignored risks had to be more company-
specific to be deemed “known” by directors.  It seems to be the case that 
“[a]s long as the board has put something in place, courts are almost certain 
 185. See Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *19. 
186. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 2009 WL 1024764 at *7 (Del. 2009). 
 187. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, at 940-42.  Hillary Sale argues that, in 
failing to notice backdating, a compensation committee “may have breached their good-faith 
obligations.”  Supra note 76, at 749-50.  If Desimone is correct, though, compensation 
committees will not be liable for backdating that occurs under their watch absent a reason to 
suspect wrongdoing.  Given the uproar surrounding the problems associated with equity 
compensation, it is doubtful, a fortiori, that other compensation decisions would subject 
committees to anything more demanding than the Desimone analysis. 
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to defer to the board . . . absent further suspicious facts.”188 
Even if knowledge of ignored risks could be inferred in the 
“suspicious” option-granting context, it says nothing about other areas, 
such as employment contracts, that don’t involve the possibility of 
securities fraud.  In Disney, there was no statutory requirement that the 
board elect Ovitz as President or that the compensation committee approve 
his employment contract.  Those lines of authority were established in the 
company’s governing documents.  A corporation could just as easily not 
require its board to be involved in such decisions.189  In fact, many of a 
company’s largest employment contracts may be negotiated solely by 
management without any input from the board.190  It is hard to imagine that 
a pro forma oversight process regarding such contracts would violate the 
duty of good faith.  In fact, the Chancery Court was explicit in its final 
Disney decision that, to the extent no governing document required 
management to keep the board involved in the employment agreement 
negotiation, Eisner’s behavior could not have violated the law.191 
Thus, the duty of oversight should do little to cause directors to alter 
their management/delegation preferences significantly.  This is not to say 
that Caremark and Stone are wrongly decided or too director-friendly.  The 
extremely high bar set in Stone follows Chancellor Allen’s observation in 
Caremark that a violation of the duty of oversight “is possibly the most 
difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win 
a judgment.”192  Given the need to delegate at least some amount of 
corporate decision-making, it would be difficult to attract directors if they 
faced significant personal liability simply because of that delegation.  
However, the duty of oversight should not be expected to establish a 
substantial likelihood of personal liability for any but the most egregiously 
bad monitor.  And even this assumes that the board did not first delegate to 
a board committee.  In that case, as discussed above, Rales will likely 
always apply and boards will apparently receive the full protection of the 
demand requirement without necessarily reaching a Caremark/Stone 
analysis.  Accordingly, the duty of good faith cannot carry much weight in 
the struggle to reduce the incentives to overdelegate. 
 188. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 79, at 1792. 
 189. Shareholders may object to the absence of such provisions, of course. 
 190. One can imagine the negotiations between a star news anchor and a television 
network or a professional athlete and a team owned by a corporation. 
 191. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 763 (noting, however, that such actions did not 
“comport with how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act”). 
 192. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
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B. The § 102(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss as a Safety Valve 
The second objection to the argument about overdelegation proceeds 
from an observation about procedure.  It applies equally to concerns 
outlined in Part III regarding board authority.  One might agree that 
directors are better off, in terms of avoiding personal liability, by 
delegating authority.  But perhaps that result has more to do with the 
impossible-to-meet Caremark/Stone standard than any distinction between 
Rales and Aronson.  Indeed, the heavy burden of establishing a breach of 
good faith through the duty of oversight is likely more important to boards 
than any difference between the two demand futility tests.193 
Along this line, although duty of care claims may be problematic for 
directors at the demand stage under Aronson, those directors can 
immediately move to dismiss the claims if exculpated under their 
corporation's charters.  If those motions are as effective in protecting 
directors as a properly structured demand futility test would be, directors 
should have no preference between board action and board non-action.  
Similarly, any blow to board authority arising from Aronson’s second 
prong would be softened by the availability of a contemporaneous motion 
to dismiss. 
It is true that Delaware courts have made it generally easy for 
directors to have duty of care claims extinguished through the invocation of 
exculpatory clauses.  Defendant directors may invoke the clause at the 
motion to dismiss stage after demand has been deemed futile.194  Such a 
clause disposes of the suit “where the factual basis for a claim solely 
implicates a violation of the duty of care.”195  Assuming the shareholder 
complaint did not raise the issue of the exculpatory clause, a motion to 
dismiss on the basis of such a clause is converted into a motion for 
summary judgment.196  Although a summary judgment motion, the 
“floodgates of discovery” are not necessarily opened to plaintiffs.197  For all 
 193.  Unlike the distinction between test in Rales and Aronson, however, Caremark’s 
permissive treatment of director oversight is at least explainable:  the board has limited 
resources with which to monitor management and a more stringent test would discourage 
people from becoming directors.  See, e.g., supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also 
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996) (describing the 
protections provided for directors' actions made in good faith as an “elementary precept of 
corporation”). 
 194.  See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1092 (Del. 2001) (discussing when a 
Section 102(b)(7) defense can be raised). 
 195.  Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (emphasis in 
original). 
 196.  See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092 (specifically describing the process of this 
conversion). 
 197.  Id. at 1091 (limiting discovery in this context to “a scope that is coextensive with 
the [exculpatory clause] issue necessary to resolve the motion”). 
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intents and purposes, then, exculpatory clauses can be used to terminate a 
due-care-only derivative suit at a very early stage in litigation. 
However, two procedural aspects of motions to dismiss on the basis of 
exculpation—relevant pleading standards and burdens of proof—pose 
problems.  Importantly, failure-to-make-demand motions are judged under 
“stringent” pleading standards requiring factual particularity.198  Plaintiffs 
must set forth the factual statements that are “essential to the claim.”199  
Courts again may make inferences in a plaintiff’s favor, but the inferences 
may only be drawn from particularized facts.200 
Motions to dismiss (or summary judgment motions) based on 
exculpatory clauses are subject to more relaxed standards.  In many cases, 
the motions are judged strictly on the pleadings, and therefore under notice 
pleading standards established by Chancery Rule 8(a).201  Notice pleading 
requires the reviewing court to assume all well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint and dismiss a complaint only if the court has “‘reasonable 
certainty’ that the plaintiff could prevail on no set of facts that may be 
inferred from the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.”202  As 
Chancellor Chandler has recently noted:  “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, a plaintiff need only plead so as to give notice of the claim; even 
vague allegations, so long as they give the opposing party notice of the 
claim, are well-pleaded.”203  Importantly, particularity is not required.204  
Instead, a court may make inferences from “general, if not conclusory, 
allegations.”205  Delaware courts are not shy about describing the 
magnitude of difference between Rule 23.1 pleading and notice pleading 
requirements.206  Indeed, at least one court has noted that the disparities 
between 23.1 and 8(a) would cause it to decide a motion differently.207 
 198.  See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (describing how the pleading in derivative suits 
differ than those governed strictly  by Chancery Rule (8)(a)). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582 (describing procedure in the Rule 23.1 context). 
 201.  See DEL. CT. CH. R. 8(a). 
 202.  Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1082-83. 
 203.  McPadden, 2008 WL 4017052, at *6. 
 204.  See Desimone, 924 A.2d at 928 (describing differences between the Rule 23.1 and 
12(b)(6) standards). 
 205.  Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582 
 206.  See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (“[Rule 23.1’s pleading requirements] differ 
substantially from the permissive notice pleadings governed solely by Chancery Rule 
8(a).”); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1083 (“This [notice pleading] standard . . . is less stringent 
than the standard applied when evaluating whether a pre-suit demand has been excused in a 
stockholder derivative suit filed pursuant to Chancery Rule 23.1.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582 (“The inquiries differ, however, in the level of detail 
demanded of the plaintiffs’ allegations and the directors at whom the inquiry is directed.”) 
 207.  See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582-83 (“[S]ome defendant directors are alleged to be 
sufficiently entangled to be lacking independence for 12(b)(6) purposes, but would be given 
the benefit of the doubt under the stricter standard of Rule 23.1.”). 
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In addition to the level of particularity required of a plaintiff, demand 
futility and exculpation motions are different insofar as they place the 
burden of persuasion on different parties.  Under Rule 23.1, the burden is 
on the plaintiff to show demand futility.  In a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
based on an exculpation clause, the burden is placed on the defendant 
directors to demonstrate that there is no allegation that they failed to act in 
good faith.208  In short, motions to dismiss based on exculpation clauses are 
not as favorable to directors as Rule 23.1 motions.209 
Consider the conscious disregard species of good faith violations 
described earlier.  Whether one consciously disregarded his or her duties 
turns, of course, on a determination about state of mind.  Yet, a director’s 
state of mind is often difficult to evaluate with any degree of confidence 
due to non-observability and the potential for mixed motivations.210  These 
weaknesses are only exacerbated when the analysis must proceed (1) 
before discovery (2) under notice pleading standards when judges must 
decide that there are no set of facts they could infer from the well-pleaded 
allegations that would allow plaintiffs to prevail and (3) with the burden of 
proving the absence of bad faith allegations on the defendant. 
Contrast this with the situation facing directors in a delegation case.  
Assuming an exculpatory clause and no other interest—or independence—
related facts, Rule 23.1 and Rales require a well-pleaded allegation of the 
ultimate fact—that the directors knew they were disabling themselves from 
discharging their duties when they delegated the relevant decision to 
management.211  Given the wide berth afforded directors with respect to 
delegation, that is a difficult test indeed, highlighting the importance of the 
 208.  Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1223-24 (describing how the burden lies with the 
party seeking the statute’s protection). 
 209.  In In re Lear, 2008 WL 4053221, at *7, Vice Chancellor Strine took the novel 
approach of incorporating an analysis of an exculpation clause’s applicability in to a 
demand futility analysis under Aronson’s second prong.  This move would solve many of 
the problems described in this Article.  However, it is not clear that the incorporation of 
exculpation considerations into a second-prong analysis is consistent with Delaware law as 
discussed in this Part.  Along this line, the two cases cited in support of the move, Guttman 
and McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 2000), are cases 
operating under the Rales framework and not Aronson.  The Supreme Court has effectively 
incorporated exculpation into its analysis of Aronson’s second prong in the LLC context.  
See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140-41 (Del. 2008).  The opinion in Wood, however, did 
not explain how Aronson’s second prong invited any consideration of the exculpation 
clause, citing to Guttman (Rales case), Stone (Rales case), Malpiede (12(b)(6) motion), 
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001) (rejecting recourse to an exculpation 
clause at the demand stage where entire fairness is necessarily the standard of review), and 
Desimone (Rales case). 
 210.  See, e.g., Einer Elhuage, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 778 (2005) (contrasting what is entailed in subjective and objective 
inquiries into directors’ motives). 
 211. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
  
746 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
 
demand futility test. 
There is an additional distinction to be made between dismissals for 
failure to make demand and dismissals based on exculpatory clauses.  Only 
directors receive the benefit of exculpation.212  Even if a subsequent motion 
to dismiss insulates directors from liability, it has no effect on executive 
liability.  When Aronson’s second prong is met, directors are stripped of 
litigation-related authority.  Aside from establishing a special litigation 
committee, they are unable to decide whether pursuing an action against an 
executive is in the corporation’s best interests.  Even if the suit is 
subsequently dismissed against the directors based on an exculpation 
clause, the directors remain powerless to make litigation decisions 
regarding the suit against the executive.  Thus, in the case of a due care 
claim against director coupled with any claim against an executive, 
Aronson’s second prong will reallocate authority to shareholder plaintiffs 
even if there is no potential liability for directors.213 
VI. REVISING ARONSON 
The incentives towards overdelegation outlined in Part IV can be fixed 
either by making Rales more like Aronson or, alternatively, by making 
Aronson more like Rales.214  Taking the former scenario, assuming board 
delegation, courts could inquire into the existence of a valid business 
judgment with respect to the Original Decision by whomever other than the 
full board acted for the corporation—either a board committee or an 
employee.  If there was a reason to doubt the validity of that business 
judgment, then demand could be excused.  The Rales test would then 
provide no more protection than the Aronson test and directors would have 
no incentive to overdelegate.215  Taking the latter scenario, assuming board 
action, application of Aronson’s second prong would simply require 
investigation of whether a majority of the board faced a substantial 
likelihood of personal liability as a result of that decision.216  If not, perhaps 
because the claim is exculpated under a 102(b)(7) clause, demand would be 
 212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7). 
 213. For an example of such a case, see McPadden v. Sidhu, 2008 WL 4017052 (Del. 
Ch. 2008).  Of course, this result is not likely troubling to those who are concerned with 
structural bias on the part of directors in favor of executives. 
 214.  Admittedly, one might be willing to pay the price of overdelegation if they 
believed that boards are less capable of responding to demands in director-action suits than 
those in director-non-action. 
 215.  Indeed, that approach would likely provide directors with less protection in 
practicality because they would be completely reliant on another party, the delegate, to 
determine whether demand is futile. 
 216.  Even more elegant would be the substitution of the test described in Desimone, 924 
A.2d at 935-36. 
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required.  Again, the Rales test would provide no more protection than the 
Aronson test and directors would have no incentive to overdelegate. 
Having controlled for distorted incentives for delegation under either 
solution, the choice between the two comes down to one’s view of board 
authority.  As a practical matter, it is safe to say that changing Rales to look 
more like Aronson would be a significant departure for Delaware law.  It 
would be hard to imagine Delaware courts letting shareholders control 
corporate litigation where (1) the underlying misconduct was that of an 
employee, (2) a majority of directors had no personal interest in the 
misconduct, and (3) a majority of the board did not face a substantial 
likelihood of personal liability based on the failure to monitor.  In short, no 
one complains much about Rales. 
At a more substantive level, broader applicability of Rales is less 
troublesome than broader applicability of Aronson.  As discussed earlier, 
all things being equal, boards are in a better position than courts to 
calculate the costs and benefits of pursuing derivative litigation.  The cost 
of excluding boards from that decision-making process when they face no 
threat of personal liability seems to be relatively high in comparison to the 
costs of leaving it up to potentially, but not necessarily, biased directors to 
pursue such actions. 
The best solution, therefore, is to revise Aronson’s second prong.  
Instead of asking whether an Original Decision was the product of a valid 
business judgment, the operative question should be whether there is a 
reasonable doubt that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood 
of personal liability.217 
 217.  Revising Aronson might also solve another issue spelled out by Vice Chancellor 
Strine in his law review article.  See Leo E. Strine, The Inescapably Empirical Foundation 
of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002) [hereinafter Empirical 
Foundation].  The following description of the problem tracks Strine’s hypothetical. Id. at 
504-10. 
  Imagine a corporation, S, that has a dominant shareholder, D.  D wants to transact 
with S.  A majority of S’s board are independent directors with no ties to D.  The transaction 
is approved by the independent directors (the “dependent” directors having abstained) and 
S’s shareholders file a derivative suit.  Reconsider Aronson’s two prongs: 
disinterest/independence relating to the Original Decision and otherwise valid business 
judgment as to the Original Decision.  Assume that the decision by the five independent 
directors would be considered an exercise of valid business judgment.  One would expect 
demand to be required unless there was reason to suspect that the directors were not really 
independent of D under Aronson’s first prong. 
  But because D is a majority shareholder, the business judgment rule is inapplicable.  
See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92-93 (Del. 2001). Instead, the entire 
fairness test is applied.  Id.  Approval by disinterested directors merely shifts the burden of 
proving fairness from the directors and D to the plaintiffs.  See, e.g., id. at 95.  When entire 
fairness is the test, how does Aronson’s second prong come out at the demand stage?  It may 
be that the application of the entire fairness test automatically means failure of Aronson’s 
second prong, notwithstanding an independent, disinterested board making an informed, 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Aronson and its two-pronged test have undoubtedly stood the test of 
time.  And, understandably, almost twenty-five years of seniority brings 
with it a degree of immunity from criticism.  Nevertheless, this Article has 
made the case that Aronson, its second prong in particular, should be 
criticized.  The second prong removes board discretion over a class of 
Demand Decisions that should belong to directors for all the reasons other 
ordinary decision-making authority rests with them.  Further Aronson’s 
second prong distorts director incentives and encourages more delegation 
than boards would otherwise choose. 
This Article does not purport to conclusively demonstrate that 
directors actually understand or respond to the incentives created by 
Aronson’s second prong.  Indeed, interviews with practitioners lead to the 
conclusion that few directors consider demand futility tests when deciding 
whether or not to delegate.  Accordingly, revising the Aronson test to 
function more like the Rales test may not yield significant improvement in 
the delegation/management balance. 
Nevertheless, the revision may provide some help in that regard.  
Moreover, it would restore board authority in Demand Decisions over 
which directors should be able to judge impartially.218  At the very least, it 
would make demand futility simpler and more direct—a noble goal in and 
of itself. 
non-wasteful decision.  See Empirical Foundation at 508 (noting the entire fairness line of 
cases’ “import may be to excuse demand under the second prong of Aronson”). 
  The Vice Chancellor describes this as a tension between Aronson and the entire 
fairness line of cases.  Id. at 510.  Implicitly, he finds the tension being generated by the 
entire fairness line.  But what if the problem is really with Aronson’s overly artificial second 
prong?  If the demand futility test was something like the one found in Rales, it would be of 
no necessary consequence that the Original Decision was not the product of a valid business 
judgment.  A court would simply look to find disinterest, independence, and no substantial 
likelihood of personal liability.  If those conditions were obtained satisfactorily, demand 
would be required. 
 218.  But see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing non-liability-related 
reasons to suspect directors’ impartiality as to Demand Decisions). 
